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Abstract
The purpose of this degree project is to study two-sided matchings where money is not
involved.
Matching theory is a branch of discrete mathematics belonging to game theory. This theory
considers markets with two disjoint sets, such as men and women, ﬁrms and workers or
colleges and students. Each agent on one sector has preferences (a complete and transitive
binary relation) over the set of agents on the opposite side. Then, a matching is a set of
pairs formed by agents of diﬀerent side, in such a way that one agent can take part in at
most one pair.
We can situate its origin in the article of Gale and Shapley (1962) "College admissions
and the stability of marriage" followed by the book of Knuth (1976), which ﬁrst edition in
French had the title of "Mariages stables".
The ﬁrst chapter of this monograph focuses on the theory of one-to-one matching, that
is known as the marriage problem. This chapter provides the theoretical basis to develop
two-sided matching theory, since the notions of stability and optimality for matchings
are studied in depth. Chapter 2 is devoted to many-to-one matching problems, say the
college admission problem, to analyse until which extent the results obtained for one-to-one
markets still hold. In these two chapters the existence of stable matchings, their properties
and the structure of the set of stable matchings are studied.
Chapter 3 is a real-life application of the theory of matchings: the school choice problem.
Here, we are going to analyse which algorithms have been used to fairly assign children to
schools. This problem is currently under study, approached from the ﬁelds of mathematics,
economics, operations research or computer science.
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Introduction
The theory of matching is a branch of (discrete) mathematics that from its very beginning
attracted the interest of economists. We can situate its origin in the article of Gale and
Shapley (1962) "College admissions and the stability of marriage" followed by the book of
Knuth (1976), which ﬁrst edition in French had the title of "Mariages stables".
This theory considers markets with two disjoint sectors (two-sided markets), such as men
and women, ﬁrms and workers or colleges and students. Each agent on one sector has
preferences (a complete and transitive binary relation) over the set of agents on the opposite
side. Then, a matching is a set of pairs formed by agents of diﬀerent side, in such a
way that one agent can take part in at most one pair. The ﬁrst desired requirement for
a matching is stability: a matching is stable if no pair of agents prefer to break their
respective partnerships in order to be matched together.
Gale and Shapley (1962) provide and algorithm, the deferred acceptance algorithm, to
obtain a stable matching for any such two-sided market. Moreover, this matching is proved
to be optimal (among all other stable matchings) for agents on one of the sides of the
market, while it is the worst stable matching for all agents of the other side. Although
they formalize the problem in terms of a marriage market (as a good example of a one-to-
one market) the real economic motivation is the college admission problem, in which each
student is assigned to only one college, but each college can receive several students, in
fact as many students as a given quota or capacity attached to the college. This is a ﬁrst
example of market design, since they prove that the same deferred acceptance algorithm
provides a stable matching in this many-to-one market.
In the years that followed, mathematicians worked on the marriage problem, basically
studying the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings (Knuth, 1976) and providing
algorithms to describe the full set of stable matchings (Gusﬁeld and Irving, 1989). Also in
these years, researchers noticed that the two-sided characteristic of the market was crucial
for the existence of a stable matching, since there are markets with its agents organized
either in only one sector or in three disjoint sectors in which no stable set of pairs or triplets
exists.
Another important feature of the marriage problem and the college admission problem
is that there is no money in these markets: partners cannot be obtained by paying a
price. In comparison to that, Shapley and Shubik (1972) present a companion model, "the
assignment game", where there are two disjoint sets of agents, say buyers and sellers, and
a valuation matrix that gathers how much each buyer values the object that each seller has
on sale. The outcome in this markets is not only a matching but also a vector of prices,
3
INTRODUCTION 4
the amount that each buyer pays to his assigned seller.
The present monograph focuses on the two-sided matching markets without money, since
they have proved to have interesting theoretical properties and moreover have been suc-
cessfully used in the last years for the design of mechanisms for real-life market situations.
In the 80's of the past century, Alvin Roth was asked to redesign the mechanism to al-
locate medical students to hospitals, what was known as the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP). He discovered that in the early 50's, the NRMP had independently
discovered Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm with hospitals proposing and
was still using it. Roth (1984) proposes to change to the deferred acceptance algorithm
with students proposing, in order to obtain the best matching for students and also because
it guarantees that students will report their true preferences. Later on, this mechanism
was slightly modiﬁed to take into account several facts, like for instance the presence of
couples of young doctors willing to be allocated to near hospitals (Roth and Peranson,
1999).
The above NRMP is an example of college admission problem. For this model, additional
notions of stability, such as group stability, can be considered. To deﬁne group stability,
colleges need to be able to compare not only individual students but also groups of students,
to determine whether one matching is better than another for a college. For arbitrary
preferences, group-stable matchings may not exist. But if preferences of colleges over sets
of students are responsive to the preferences they have over individuals, then pairwise
stability coincides with group stability and existence is hence guaranteed.
School choice problems are another example of market design. In a school choice problems,
students have preferences over schools and again each school has a given quota or capacity.
The diﬀerence is that now schools do not have preferences over children, just a priority
order over them that comes from objective issues determined by the school authorities:
living in walking distance to school, having siblings in the same school... This fact makes
this market not a real two-sided market. However, the notion of stable matching can be
similarly deﬁned.
Each school district has a diﬀerent procedure to solve this allocation problem. In Boston
the mechanism used before 2005 was not satisfactory for the authorities since it was not
envy-free (a student could be allocated to a school he did not liked much, while another
school he preferred more had accepted another student with lower priority than himself).
The mechanism was also not strategy-proof, it gave incentives to parents to misrepresent
their true preferences over schools. Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak, Roth and Sonmez (2005)
proposed to change either to Gale and Shapley's Deferred Acceptance mechanism or to
Gale's Top Trading Cycle mechanism. The ﬁrst one produces a stable matching and is
strategy proof, but may fail to achieve eﬃciency. On the other side, the Top Trading Cycle
mechanism is eﬃcient and strategy-proof, but may fail to satisfy stability. Finally, the
Deferred Acceptance mechanism was adopted in Boston school district, and also in New
York High School admission problem (Abdulkadiroglu, Pathak and Roth, 2005).
The ﬁrst chapter of this monograph focuses on the theory of one-to-one matching, that is
known as the marriage problem. Chapter 2 is devoted to many-to-one matching problems,
say the college admission problem, to analyse until which extent the results obtained for
one-to-one markets still hold. In these two chapters the existence of stable matchings, their
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properties and the structure of the set of stable matchings are analysed. Together with
the articles where this research was initially published, our monograph relies on the book
of Roth and Sotomayor (1990), "Two sided matching: a game-theoretical approach", the
book of Knuth (1976), "Stable marriage and its relation to other combinatorial problems",
and the text of Gusﬁeld and Irving (1989), "The stable marriage problem: structure and
algorithms". The reader will realize from the literature that, from the very beginning,
this kind of problems have been approached from the ﬁelds of mathematics, economics,
operations research and computer science.
Two real-life applications of the college admission problem are included in this monograph.
Chapter 2 includes the National Resident Matching Program and the School Choice Prob-
lem is developed in Chapter 3.
There exist other interesting applications of the theory of matching to the Roomate Prob-
lem, the Housing Allocation and Exchange and the Kidney Exchange. For a survey on
these topics see the paper of Alvin Roth in Econometrica (2002), his Hahn Lecture (2008)
or his Noble Lecture (2012). Also Sonmez and Unver chapter in the Handbook in Social
Economics (2011).
In all this theory, and also in its practical applications, two algorithms are essential: the
Deferred Acceptance Algorithm and the Top Trading Cycle Algorithm. We include their
codes in an appendix.
David Gale, who was one of the authors of both algorithms, died in 2008. The Sveriges
Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 was awarded jointly
to Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice
of market design".
Chapter 1
The marriage model
The marriage problem is a particular case of a two-sided matching market. In a two-sided
market, the agents are partitioned in two disjoint sets. In contrast with other two-sided
models, between buyers and sellers or ﬁrms and workers, in which utility is transferable by
means of prices or salaries, the data of these markets are just the preferences of each agent
over the agents on the opposite side. The output, of such a market, is a matching, that is,
a partition of the agents in pairs formed by agents of diﬀerent sector or individuals.
Typically, in the literature, this market, is known as a marriage market, since, as in mar-
riage, each agent is matched with only one agent of the opposite side.
In chapter 2 we will consider similar markets where some agents may have several partners,
and hence the image of marriage will not be useful any more.
1.1 Stable matchings
The aim of this chapter is to present formally the marriage model, focusing on ﬁnding
matchings that nobody will regret, that is, stable matchings, and deeply study their prop-
erties.
1.1.1 The formal model
As stated before, the purpose of this section is to introduce terminology and notation about
marriage markets and the main concepts of a formal cooperative model.
We will suppose the general rules governing this market are these:
1. Any man and woman who both consent to marry one to another may proceed to do
so.
2. Any man or woman is free to withhold his or her consent and remain single.
Let M and W be two ﬁnite and disjoints sets, M = {m1, · · · ,mn} called the set of the
men and and W = {w1, · · · , wp} called the set of the women. Each man m ∈ M has
6
CHAPTER 1. THE MARRIAGE MODEL 7
preferences over the women and each woman w ∈W has preferences over the men.
To express these preferences concisely, the preference of each man m will be represented
by an ordered list of preferences, P (m) ∈ W ∪ {m}. A man m's preferences might be of
the form:
P (m) = {w3, w4,m,w1, · · · , wp}.
The ﬁrst choice of the man m is to be married whit w3, the second is to be married with
w4 and his third choice is to remain single.
If a man m′ is indiﬀerent between several options, say w2, w3, w5, we denote them by
brackets in his list:
P (m′) = {w1, [w2, w3, w5],m′, · · · , wp}.
Similarly, each woman w ∈W has an ordered list of preferences, P (w) ∈M ∪ {w}.
Since each man (woman) will never match a woman (man) that is after the option of
remaining single in his preference list, we will usually describe agent's preferences by writing
only the ordered set of people that are preferred more than being single. Hence, in (1.1.1)
we write:
P (m) = {w3, w4}.
Deﬁnition 1.1.1. We denote a speciﬁc marriage market by the triple (M,W,P ), where:
• M the men's set.
• W the women's set.
• P is the set of preferences lists P = {P (m1), · · · , P (mn), P (w1), · · · , P (wp)}.
Following with notations and terminology, we write w >m w′ to mean the man m prefers
the woman w more than woman w′, and w ≥m w′ to mean m prefers w at least as much
as w′. Moreover, woman w is acceptable to man m if he likes her at least as much as
remaining single, that is, if w ≥m m.
Formally, a preference of an individual is a binary relation over its set of alternatives that
is complete (any two alternatives can be compared) and transitive. This is the reason we
can represent it by a list.
An individual player has strict preferences if he or she is not indiﬀerent between any two
acceptable alternatives.
Deﬁnition 1.1.2. We say that individuals have rational preferences if their preferences
have the property of transitivity and complete ordering.
Our goal is to ﬁnd out what kind of outcome will result from the collective interaction
between men and women. An outcome of the marriage market is a set of marriages. In
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general, and due to the rules of the game, some people may remain single, i.e. self-matched.
Formally we deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 1.1.3. A matching, of the marriage market, is a one to one correspondence
µ :M ∪W −→M ∪W , such that,
• µ(m) ∈W ∪ {m}.
• µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w}.
• µ2 = Id.
We refer to µ(x) as the mate of x.
Notice that a matching is a map of order two, that means that if a man m is matched to
a woman w then the woman w is matched to man m.
Deﬁnition 1.1.4. We say that an agent x is acceptable for an agent y if x >y y.
The ﬁrst requirement for a good matching will be that the members of each pair are
mutually acceptable.
Deﬁnition 1.1.5. The matching µ is individually rational if each agent is acceptable to
his or her mate. That is, a matching is individually rational if it is not blocked by any
agent.
Note that, no matter what preferences the agents have, at least one individually rational
matching will exist, since the matching that leaves every agent single is always individually
rational. But these types of matchings are not likely to tell us much. The following
deﬁnition gives us the matching that will persist over the time and will tell us much more
than that where all agents remain singles.
Deﬁnition 1.1.6. A matching µ is blocked by a pair (m,w) if m >w µ(w) and w >m µ(m).
Deﬁnition 1.1.7. A matching µ is stable if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair
of agents, that is:
• µ is individually rational.
• ∀m ∈M and w ∈W such that µ(m) 6= w,
 µ(m) ≥m w or,
 µ(w) ≥w m.
On the contrary, we say a matching µ is blocked by a pair (m,w) such that µ(m) 6= w if
m >w µ(w) and w >m µ(m).
Example. Consider a marriage market where there are four men and four women, with
the list of preferences in 1.1
All possible matchings are individually rational, since all pairs (m,w) are mutually accept-
able. We aﬃrm that the following matching is stable:
µ = ((m1, w4), (m2, w3), (m3, w2), (m4, w1))
Stability may be veriﬁed by considering each man in turn as a potential member of a blocking
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P (m1) w2 w4 w1 w3 P (w1) m2 m1 m4 m3
P (m2) w3 w1 w4 w2 P (w2) m4 m3 m1 m2
P (m3) w2 w3 w1 w4 P (w3) m1 m4 m3 m2
P (m4) w4 w1 w3 w2 P (w4) m2 m1 m4 m3
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.1: Preference list on a marriage market
pair. We can observe that m1 could form a blocking pair only with w2 but she prefers her
partner so, this is not a blocking pair. Men m2 and m3 will never form part of a blocking
pair since each of them is matched to his most preferred woman. Finally m4 only could
block together with w4 but w4 prefers her partner rather than m4. So the matching µ is
stable.
How to ﬁnd stable matchings given a marriage market, and the consequences of this out-
come, will be studied in the following sections.
1.1.2 Deferred acceptance algorithm
In this section we are going to discuss an algorithm, which produces a stable matching
starting from any preference list. As we have seen in the previous example, it could be
lengthy to prove if a given matching µ is stable or not, particularly for large markets. We
are going to described the original version given by Shapley 1 and Gale2.
We recall that in the previous section we have ensured the existence of, at least, one
matching, the one with all agents remaining singles but this may be unstable.
Theorem 1.1.1. (Gale and Shapley) A stable matching exists for every marriage market.
Proof. We shall proof existence by giving an iterative procedure for actually ﬁnding a
stable set of marriages.
To start, let each man propose to his favourite woman, which is the ﬁrst woman on his
preference list of acceptable women. Each woman rejects the proposal of any man who is
not acceptable to her, and each woman who receives more than one proposal rejects all but
her most preferred of these. Any man whose proposal is not rejected at this point is kept
engaged. However he could be rejected on the next stage if this woman receives a better
proposal.
1Lloyd Stowell Shapley (June 2, 1923) is a distinguished American mathematician and Nobel Prize
winning economist. He is a Professor Emeritus at University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), aﬃliated
with departments of Mathematics and Economics. He has contributed to the ﬁelds of mathematical
economics and especially game theory.
2David Gale (December 13, 1921 - March 7, 2008) was a distinguished American mathematician and
economist. He was a professor emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, aﬃliated with the
departments of Mathematics, Economics, and Operations Research. He has contributed to the ﬁelds of
mathematical economics, game theory, and convex analysis.
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At any step any man who was rejected at the previous step proposes to his next choice,
as long as there remains an acceptable woman to whom he has not yet proposed. Each
woman receiving proposals rejects any from unacceptable men, and also rejects all but her
most preferred among the group consisting of the new proposers together with any man
she may have kept engaged from the previous step.
The algorithm stops after any step in which no man is rejected. We can ensure that
algorithm ends since the set of women is ﬁnite and in the procedure a man never proposes
to a woman that previously rejected him.
At the end of the algorithm every man is either engaged to some woman or has been
rejected by every woman on his list of acceptable woman, so he is single. In the same way,
women who did not receive any acceptable proposal remain single too.
This procedure ensures that the outcome matching is individually rational, since no man
or woman is ever engaged to an unacceptable partner.
Moreover the matching that results is not blocked by a pair. Indeed assume (m,w) blocks µ,
then m prefers w to his partner µ(m), w >m µ(m) and w prefers m to µ(m), m >w µ(w).
But then, m has proposed w before proposing µ(m) and has been rejected. If at that
moment w was not engaged, she would have accepted and not replaced him by µ(w). If
w was engaged at that moment and her partner was not preferred to µ(w), he would also
been not preferred to m. Hence w would have accepted m when he proposed, which is a
contradiction.
We call this algorithm a "deferred acceptance" procedure, to emphasize the fact that
women are able to keep the best available man at any step engaged, without accepting him
outright.
The outcome of the deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA) with men proposing is denoted
by µM and we write µW when women propose. This two stable matchings will not typically
be the same.
At this point we have to introduce some more notation that allow us to compare between
diﬀerent matchings.
Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings. We denote µ >M µ′ if:
• µ(m) ≥ µ′(m) for all m ∈M and,
• µ(m) >M µ′ for at least one man m ∈M .
In a precisely similar way, we deﬁne ≥W or >W to represent the common preferences of
the women over alternative matchings.
Deﬁnition 1.1.8. For a given marriage market (M,W,P ), a stable matching µ is M-
optimal if every man likes it at least as well as any other stable matching, that is for every
other stable matching µ′, µ ≥M µ′. Analogously we can deﬁne W-optimal matches.
Actually when all agents have strict preferences, there are systematic elements of common
interests among the men (and among the women), even in cases in which all men are
competing for the same woman, and all women are competing for the same man.
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Deﬁnition 1.1.9. An agent x is achievable for an agent y if µ(x) = y for some µ stable.
Deﬁnition 1.1.10. We say that agents have strict preferences if nobody is indiﬀerent
between several options.
Theorem 1.1.2. (Gale and Shapley) When all men and women have strict preferences
there always exists an M-optimal stable matching, and a W-optimal stable matching. Fur-
thermore, the matching µM produced by the deferred acceptance algorithm with men propos-
ing is the M-optimal stable matching. The W-optimal stable matching is the matching µW
produced by the algorithm when women propose.
Proof. We are going to show that, when all men and women have strict preferences, in the
deferred acceptance algorithm no man is ever rejected by an achievable woman. Conse-
quently, the stable matching µM matches each man to his most preferred achievable woman
and, hence, µM is M-optimal. We are going to prove it by induction:
• Step 1: It is clear that in the ﬁrst step no man is rejected by any achievable woman.
• Step k: Assume that in the k − 1th step in the procedure no man has yet been
rejected by a woman who is achievable for him. At this step, suppose woman w
rejects man m. If she rejects m as unacceptable, then she is unachievable for him,
and we are done. If he is acceptable to her but she rejects him in favour of m′, whom
she keeps engaged, then she prefers m′ to m, m′ >w m. We must show that w is not
achievable for m.
We know that m′ prefers w to any woman except for those who have previously
rejected him, and hence (by the induction assumption) are unachievable for him.
Consider an hypothetical matching µ that matches m to w and everyone else to an
achievable mate, we have m′ >w m = µ(w). Then m′ prefers w to his mate at µ,
w >′m µ(m′), since preferences are strict, so the matching is unstable because it is
blocked by the pair (m′, w).
Therefore there is no stable matching that matches m and w, and so they are un-
achievable for each other. Hence, µM (m) is the most preferred among all achievable
woman and we ﬁnally conclude that the matching µM is M-optimal.
The proof is analogous when women propose.
In the previous theorem we proved that the agents on one side of the market have a
common interest regarding the set of stable matchings, since they are in agreement on the
best stable matching. But now, we are going to prove that agents on the opposite site of
the market have opposite interests in this regard, this is that the optimal stable matching
for one side of the market is the worst stable matching for the other site of the market.
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Theorem 1.1.3. (Knuth 3) When all agents have strict preferences, the common prefer-
ences of the two sides of the market are opposed on the set of stable matchings: if µ and
µ′ are stable matching, then all men like µ at least as well as µ′ if and only if all women
like µ′ at least as well as µ. That is, µ >M µ′ if and only if µ′ >W µ.
Proof. We shall prove both implications:
⇒) Let µ and µ′ be stable matchings such that µ >M µ′. We will show that µ′ >W µ.
Suppose that it is not true, so µ ≥W µ′. Then, there must be at least one woman w
who strictly prefers µ to µ′. Obviously this woman has a diﬀerent mate at µ and µ′
and due to the fact that all stable matchings are individually rational, if w prefers
µ(w) to µ′(w) then w is not single at µ. consequently m = µ(w).
Man m, who has also strict preferences, and woman w form a blocking pair for the
matching µ′: m = µ(w) >w µ′(w) and w = µ(m) >m µ′(m), and this contradicts the
assumption that µ′ is stable, so µ′ >W µ.
⇐) Due to the symmetry of the marriage market the proof is analogous.
Corollary 1.1.4. When all agents have strict preferences, the M-optimal stable matching
is the worst stable matching for the women and the W-optimal stable matching matches
each man with his least preferred achievable mate, this is, it is the worst for the men.
Example. Consider a marriage market where there are ﬁve men and four women, with
the preference list in 1.2. Applying the deferred acceptance algorithm we can ﬁnd, as we
demonstrate, a M-optimal and W-optimal stable matchings.
P (m1) w1 w2 w3 w4 P (w1) m2 m3 m1 m4 m5
P (m2) w4 w2 w3 w1 P (w2) m3 m1 m2 m4 m5
P (m3) w4 w3 w1 w2 P (w3) m5 m4 m1 m2 m3
P (m4) w1 w4 w3 w2 P (w4) m1 m4 m5 m2 m3
P (m5) w1 w2 w4
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.2: Preference list on a marriage market
µM = ((m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4), (m5))
µW = (m1, w4), (m2, w1), (m3, w2), (m4, w3), (m5))
3Donald Ervin Knuth (January 10, 1938) is an American computer scientist, mathematician, and pro-
fessor emeritus at Stanford University. He is the author of the multi-volume work The Art of Computer
Programming. Knuth has been called the "father of the analysis of algorithms".
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In this example we have veriﬁed Theorem 1.1.2, all men like µM at least as well as µW
and all women like µW at least as well as µM . Besides, it is obvious that the matchings
are not the same.
In appendix A, we propose a code in C to compute the matching resulting of applying
the Deferred Acceptance algorithm when men are proposing. It has been necessary to add
some assumptions in order to simplify the problem.
1.2 The lattice property
In what follows we are going to assume that all agents have strict preferences. In the
previous section we saw that there always exist at least one stable matching and, if this
matching is produced by the deferred acceptance algorithm with men proposing is the M-
optimal stable matching, and if are women who propose it is a W-optimal stable matching.
We ﬁnished the section mentioning that the M-optimal matching is the worst matching for
women. Due to this properties we are going to be able to produce new stable matchings
from two given stable matchings and we shall prove that the set of the stable matchings
forms a distributive lattice under a natural ordering relation, and the M-optimal and W-
optimal matches are the inﬁmum and the supremum of the lattice.
Let µ and µ′ be two stable matchings such that, µ, µ′ : M ∪W −→ M ∪W . We can
deﬁne:
λ := µ ∨M µ′ =
{
λ(m) = µ(m) if µ(m) >m µ
′(m)
λ(m) = µ′(m) if µ(m) ≤m µ′(m)
We can observe that this function assigns each man his more preferred mate from µ and
µ′, and consequently it assigns each woman her less preferred mate. Deﬁne now,
υ := µ ∧M µ′ =
{
υ(m) = µ(m) if µ(m) <m µ
′(m)
υ(m) = µ′(m) if µ(m) ≥m µ′(m)
This function assigns each man his less preferred mate and it assigns each woman her more
preferred mate.
Theorem 1.2.1. The Lattice theorem. (Conway4)When all preferences are strict, if µ
and µ′ are stable matchings, then the functions λ = µ ∨M µ′ and υ = µ ∧M µ′ are both
matchings. Furthermore, they are both stable.
Proof. First, we are going to prove that both functions are matchings, in fact we prove it
only for the λ function, for the υ function the argument is symmetric. After that we prove
that both matchings are stable.
4John Horton Conway (December 26, 1937) is a British mathematician active in the theory of ﬁnite
groups, knot theory, number theory, combinatorial game theory and coding theory. Conway is currently
Professor of Mathematics and John Von Neumann Professor in Applied and Computational Mathematics
at Princeton University
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• Matchings: Suppose that man m and m′ received the same partner w according to
λ, this is possible if (m,w) is a pair in µ and (m′, w) is a pair in µ′. Then µ >m µ′
and µ′ >m′ µ. Then Theorem 1.1.3 applied to the pair (m,w) implies that m′ >w m
and applied to the pair (m′, w) implies that m >w m′ giving a contradiction.
Hence, a matching does result.
• Stability: Suppose that λ is not stable, then it exists at least one pair (m,w) that
blocks the matching. This is, w >m λ(m) from which it follows, from the deﬁnition
of λ that w >m µ(m) and w >m µ′(m). On the other hand m >w λ(w). Hence, if
λ(w) = µ(w) then (m,w) blocks µ, and if λ(w) = µ′(w) then (m,w) blocks µ′.
In either case we get a contradiction, since µ and µ′ are both stable.
The existence of M-optimal and W-optimal stable matchings can be deduced from this
theorem and due to the fact that there are only a ﬁnite number of stable matchings.
Deﬁnition 1.2.1. A lattice is a partially ordered set L in which every two elements a,
b have a supremum, denoted by a ∨ b and an inﬁmumm denoted by a ∧ b. A lattice L is
complete when each of its subsets X has a supremum and an inﬁmum in L.
We have introduced the notation of lattice to testify that the lattice theorem, as its name
indicates, demonstrates that the set of stable matchings is a lattice. This observation is
important because it gives to our set of stable matchings an algebraic structure.
Theorem 1.2.2. When preferences are strict, the set of stable matchings is a distributive
lattice under the common order of the men, dual to the common order of the women.
Once we have seen that the set of stable matchings is a distributive lattice, we can ask
ourselves if it is a distributive lattice with particular property.
Theorem 1.2.3. Every ﬁnite distributive lattice equals the set of stable matchings of some
marriage market.
Since the lattice of stable matchings is not a particular one but any distributive lattice can
be shown to be a lattice of stable matchings this line of investigation will not bear any
further fruit.
In section 1.5 we are going to give an algorithm to compute all possible stable matchings
and we are going to illustrate it by an example using the theory developed in this section.
1.3 Weak Pareto eﬃciency
In this new section we want to develop new theory focused on marriage markets with strict
preferences. We are going to prove again almost all our previous obtained results, using
only properties about stability and optimality.
In what follows optimality an eﬃciency will refer to the same concept and would be used
interchangeably.
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We will need some notation to discuss what happens when a man or a woman extends his
(her) list of acceptable women (men) by adding people to the end of the original list of
acceptable partners.
We will write P ′m ≥ Pm if P ′m is such an extension of Pm, and we will write P ′ ≥M P if
P ′m ≥ Pm ∀m ∈M . Similarly for women.
Theorem 1.3.1. Decomposition Lemma (Gale and Sotomayor). Let µ and µ′ be,
respectively, two stable matchings in markets (M,W,P ) and (M,W,P ′) with P ′ ≥M P ,
and all preferences are strict. Let M(µ′) be the set of men who prefer µ′ to µ under P and
let W (µ) be the set of women who prefer µ to µ′ under P . Then µ′ and µ map M(µ′) onto
W (µ). That is, µ′ and µ match any man who prefers µ′ to a woman who prefers µ, and
vice versa.
Proof. Suppose m ∈ M(µ′), then, by deﬁnition of the set M(µ′), µ′(m) >m µ(m) ≥m m,
under P so µ′(m) ∈ W . Setting w = µ′(m), we cannot have µ′(w) >w µ(w) for then
(m,w) would block µ. Hence, since preferences are strict, w ∈ W (µ) and so µ′(M(µ′)) is
contained in W (µ).
On the other hand, if w ∈ W (µ) then µ(w) >w µ′(w) ≥w w, so µ(w) ∈ M . Letting
µ(w) = m, we see that we cannot have µ(m) >m µ′(m) under P ′ because (m,w) would
block µ′. Hence, since the preferences are strict, µ′(m) >m µ(m) = w >m m under P ′ and
P so m ∈M(µ′) and µ(W (µ)) is contained in M(µ′).
Since µ and µ′ are one-to-one and M(µ) and W (µ′) are ﬁnite, the conclusion follows.
Corollary 1.3.2. Decomposition lemma when P = P'. Let µ and µ′ be stable match-
ings in (M,W,P ), where all preferences are strict. Let M(µ) be the set of men who prefer
µ to µ′ and W (µ) the set of women who prefer µ to µ′. Analogously deﬁne M(µ′) and
W (µ′). Then µ :M(µ′) 7→W (µ) and µ′ :M(µ) 7→W (µ′).
We can observe that this result allows us to give an alternate proof of the Theorem 1.1.3.
Proof. Alternative proof of Theorem 1.1.3: µ′ >M µ under P if and only if M(µ) is empty
and M(µ′) is non-empty. This is equivalent to µ(m) = µ′(m) for all m ∈ M −M(µ′)
and W (µ) is non-empty, which in turn is satisﬁed if and only if µ(w) = µ′(w) for all
w ∈W −W (µ) and µ(w) >w µ′(w) for some w, and this is equivalent to µ >W µ′.
In the next theorem we are concerned about the particular group of people who remain
single. Its proof is an immediate consequence of the decomposition lemma when P = P ′.
Theorem 1.3.3. In a market (M,W,P ) with strict preferences, the set of people who are
single is the same for all stable matchings.
Proof. Suppose m was matched under µ′, so m is not single, and unmatched under µ, so
m is single. Then, m ∈ M(µ′), but from the decomposition lemma with P = P ′, µ maps
W (µ) onto M(µ′), so m is also matched under µ, which is a contradiction.
Similarly, the lattice property of the set of stable matchings can also been proved by means
of the decomposition lemma. For a detailed proof see [11].
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The next theorem takes another look at the sense in which the M-optimal stable matching
is optimal for all men. We have already studied the sense in which it is as good a stable
matching as the men can achieve, but now we want to ask whether there might not be
some other unstable matching that all the men would prefer.
Theorem 1.3.4. Weak Pareto 5 optimality for the men. There is no individually
rational matching µ (stable or not) such that µ >m µM for all m ∈M
Proof. We shall prove it using the deferred acceptance algorithm with some additional
assumptions:
1. We are going to suppose that #M = #W , that is, there are as many men as women
in the market.
2. All possible matchings are going to be individually rational, that is, the preference
proﬁle is such that all pairs (m,w) are mutually acceptable.
With this limitation the deferred acceptance algorithm (for men proposing) has an impor-
tant property that it has not in the general case:
If w is the last woman to become engaged, no man is rejected by w (since the algorithm
terminates when the last woman receives her ﬁrst proposal).
Now, we can start the proof.
Clearly there can be no stable matching µ with the property stated, since µM is optimal
among all stable matchings. Suppose that there exists an unstable matching µ such that
µ >M µM . If w is the last woman to become engaged by the deferred acceptance algorithm,
due to the property mentioned, no man has been rejected by w.
Let us suppose that µM (w) = m and m′ = µ(w), then, by the assumption µ(m′) = w >m′
µM (m
′), so w must have rejected m′ which is a contradiction.
We have seen that the optimal stable matching for one side of the market is weakly Pareto
optimal for the agents on that side of the market. This means there is no matching that
all those agents prefer.
We are going to give an example to show that it can exist a matching µ, unstable, such
that: µ(m) ≥m µM (m) ∀m ∈M and ∃m′ such that µ >m′ µM .
Example. Consider the example of a particular marriage market with preferences detailed
in 1.3 .
Then, using the deferred acceptance algorithm:
µM = ((m1, w1), (m2, w3), (m3, w2)) .
Nevertheless,
µ = ((m1, w2), (m2, w3), (m3, w1)) .
5Vilfredo Federico Damaso Pareto ( 15 July 1848 - 19 August 1923) was an Italian economist who ﬁrst
focused on the kind of optimality where a collective prefers optimality to stability
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P (m1) w2 w1 w3 P (w1) m1 m2 m3
P (m2) w1 w2 w3 P (w2) m3 m1 m2
P (m3) w1 w2 w3 P (w3) m1 m2 m3
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.3: Preference list on a marriage market
leaves m2 no worse than under µM , but beneﬁts m1 and m3. We, obviously, can observe
that µ is not stable since,
w1 >m2 µ(m2) = w3
m2 >w1 µ(w1) = m3
and, (m2, w1) blocks µ.
1.4 The core
We have already analysed the structure of the set of stable matchings, to see it has a
lattice structure, which has lead to several interesting consequences regarding optimal
stable matchings and opposition of interests between the two sides of the market.
Now, we analyse whether stable matchings can be blocked by bigger coalitions. This is
related to the notion of core, which is a basic notion in other coalitional problems.
In a more general setting of coalitions games, the rules of the game together with the
speciﬁc preferences of the players induce a relation on the outcomes, called domination
relation.
Deﬁnition 1.4.1. For any two feasible outcomes x and y, x dominates y if and only if
there exists a coalition of players S such that:
• Every member of the coalition S prefers x to y.
• The rules of the game give the coalition S the power to enforce x (over y).
This is, x dominates y if there is some coalition S whose members have both the incentive
and the means to replace y with x. For this reason we might expect that y will not be the
outcome of the game.
Given a dominance relation among outcomes, we deﬁne the core of the game. Notice that
the notion of core can be considered in many diﬀerent settings, whenever a dominance
relation among outcomes is deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1.4.2. The core of a game is the set of undominated outcomes.
It is important to note the diﬀerence between the deﬁnition of the core and the deﬁnition
of the set of the stable matchings. The ﬁrst one, the core, is deﬁned via a domination
relation in which all coalitions play a potential role, whereas the second one, the set of
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stable matchings, is deﬁned with respect to certain kinds of coalitions, individual and
mixed-pairs only.
That is, an outcome fails to be in the core if it is blocked by any coalition of agents, whereas
it fails to be a stable matching only if it is blocked by some individual agent or by some
pair of agents.
Let us now introduce a dominance relation in the setting of matchings in a market.
Deﬁnition 1.4.3. A matching µ′ dominates another matching µ if and only if there exists
a coalition A ∈W ∪M , such that, for all m,w ∈ A:
• µ′(m) ∈ A and µ′(w) ∈ A.
• µ′(m) >m µ(m) and µ′(w) >w µ(w).
The following theorem shows that for the marriage market, nothing has been lost by
ignoring coalitions other than singletons and pairs.
Theorem 1.4.1. The core of the marriage market equals the set of stable matchings.
Proof. We shall prove both directions:
⊂ We shall prove that any matching in the core is stable. Let µ be in the core and let
us see it is stable. If µ is individually irrational, then it is dominated via a singleton
coalition, and if its unstable via some man m and woman w, with m >w µ(w) and
w >m µ(m), then it is dominated via the coalition {m,w} by any matching µ′ with
µ′(m) = w.
⊃ We shall proof that stable matchings are in the core. Take a stable matching µ. If µ
is not in the core, then µ is dominated by some matching µ′ via a coalition A. This
is,
 ∀m ∈ A, µ′(m) >m µ(m).
 ∀w ∈ A, µ′(m) >w µ(m).
 If m ∈ A and w ∈ A then µ′(w) ∈ A and µ′(m) ∈ A.
If µ is individually irrational then µ is not stable and we reach a contradiction.
Assume µ is individually rational, then: ∀m ∈ A, µ′(m) >m µ(m) ≥m m so µ′(m) >m
m and ∀w ∈ A, µ′(w) >w µ(w) ≥w w so µ′(w) >w w. We can conclude that
µ′(m) ∈W and µ′(w) ∈M .
Take any w ∈ A, as we just have proved, µ′(w) = m ∈ A. Let us see that (m,w)
blocks µ.
 µ′(m) >m µ(m) because m is in the coalition A.
 µ′(w) >w µ(w) because w is in the coalition A.
So, such µ is blocked, by the pair (m,w) and µ is no stable which is a contradiction.
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The above theorem shows that if a matching µ is not stable, then it is not in the core of
the market; that is, there is some matching µ′ that dominates µ.
We will see in the next chapter that for two-sided markets where matchings are not one-
to-one but many-to-one, the set of stable matchings and the core may diﬀer.
1.5 Computational questions
In this section we turn to some computational questions about the marriage model. We are
going to focus on marriages where agents have strict preferences. We are going to return
to the lattice property of a market and we will be able to give an algorithm to compute
every stable matching given a market. Moreover, we are going to study the number of
stable matchings and ﬁnd a lower and an upper bound for this number.
1.5.1 An algorithm to compute every stable matching
We shall consider that P is a preference proﬁle then P (x) will be the list of acceptable
people of the agent x, with the inclusion of x as the last entrance.
From the optimality of µM and µW follows that if (m,w) is a mutually acceptable pair and
w >m µM (m), or m >w µW (w), then m and w cannot be matched at any stable matching.
This suggest that the preference lists can be shortened using a reduction procedure and
without changing the set of stable matchings. For all m ∈M and w ∈W :
Step 1: Remove from m's list of acceptable women all w ∈W who are more preferred than
µM (m). Do the same for each woman.
Thus, µM (m) will be the ﬁrst entry in m's reduced list and µW (w) will be the ﬁrst entry
in w′s reduced list.
Step 2: Remove from w's list of acceptable men all who are less preferred than µM (w) (we
here apply Corollary 1.1.4). Remove from m's list of acceptable women all who are less
preferred than µW (m) .
Thus, µM (w) will be the last entry in w's reduced list and µW (m) will be the last entry
in m′s reduced list.
Step 3: After steps one and two, if m is not acceptable to w (i.e., if m is not on w's
preference list as now modiﬁed), then remove w from m′s list of acceptable women, and
similarly remove from w's list of acceptable men any man m to whom w is no longer
acceptable.
We have, ﬁnally, that m will be acceptable to w if and only if w is acceptable to m after
step three.
In general, if µ is any stable matching and we replace µM by µ in the reduction process
described, the resulting proﬁle will be called a proﬁle of reduced lists for the original market
and will be denoted by P (µ).
CHAPTER 1. THE MARRIAGE MODEL 20
Properties: We can deduce from the construction of P (µ):
• µ(m) is the ﬁrst entry of P (µ)(m) and µ(w) is the last entry of P (µ)(w). µW (m) is
the last entry of P (µ)(m) and µW (w) is the ﬁrst entry of P (µ)(w).
• µ is the M-optimal stable matching under P (µ) and µW is the W-optimal stable
matching under P (µ).
• m is acceptable to w if and only if w is acceptable to m under P (µ).
• If a man or woman is the only acceptable man or woman for someone on the other
side of the market, then he or she is not acceptable to anyone else.
Deﬁnition 1.5.1. A set of men {a1, · · · , ar} deﬁnes a cycle for some proﬁle of reduced
lists, P (µ) if:
• For i = 1, · · · , r−1, the second woman in P (µ)(ai) is µ(ai+1), that is the ﬁrst woman
in P (µ)(ai+1).
• The second woman in P (µ)(ar) is µ(a1), that is the ﬁrst woman in P (µ)(a1).
We denote such a cycle by σ = (a1, · · · , ar) and we say that ai generates the cycle σ for
any i = 1, · · · , r.
Example. Consider the preference proﬁle given in 1.4:
P (µ)(a1) w3 w5 w2
P (µ)(a2) w5 w2 · · ·
P (µ)(a3) w2 w3 · · ·
Figure 1.4: Preference list on a marriage market
We can see that the second woman in P (µ)(a1) is w5 which is the ﬁrst woman in P (µ)(a2);
w2 is the second woman in P (µ)(a2) and is the ﬁrst woman in P (µ)(a3). Finally w3 is
both the ﬁrst woman in P (µ)(a1) and the second woman in P (µ)(a3).
Hence σ = (a1, a2, a3) is a cycle.
It is clear that we can only have a cycle if P (µ)(m) has more than one acceptable woman
for some m. In the previous example we can ﬁnd a cycle without using any algorithm, but
sometimes, when we have large markets, it is useful to deﬁne a procedure to ﬁnd it.
Let p1 be an arbitrary man such that P (µ)(p1) contains more than one woman. Then we
can construct an oriented graph, whose nodes are M ∪W , as follows:
• There is an arc from pi to qi+1 if qi+1 is the second woman in P (µ)(pi).
• There is an arc from qi to pi if pi is the last man in P (µ)(qi), that is µ(qi) = pi.
This graph will close at some step (when some qs or ps is repeated) and then we will get
a cycle.
Deﬁnition 1.5.2. Let µ a stable matching and σ = (a1, · · · , ar) a cycle for P (µ). Then
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we can deﬁne a matching µ′, called cyclic matching under P (µ), as follows:
µ′(ai) = µ(ai+1) ∀i = 1, · · · , r − 1.
µ′(ar) = µ(a1).
µ′(m) = µ(m) ∀m /∈ σ.
Proposition 1.5.1. Let P (µ) be a proﬁle of reduced lists. If µ′ is a cyclic matching under
P (µ), then µ′ is stable under the original preferences.
To prove this proposition we need some more theory that we are not going to develop in
this monograph because it exceeds the main aim of this section. For this reason we made
the statement here without proof.
We now can develop an algorithm to ﬁnd every stable matching given a marriage market:
Step 1 Find, by the deferred acceptance procedure, µM , µW and P (µM ).
Step k For each proﬁle P ′ of reduced lists obtained in step (k− 1), ﬁnd all cor-
responding cycles and for each cycle obtain the corresponding cyclic matching
for P ′. Then for each cyclic matching µ obtain the proﬁle of reduced lists P (µ).
This algorithm stops after a ﬁnite number of steps, as next proposition shows.
Proposition 1.5.2. The algorithm stops at step n if and only if we obtain only one proﬁle
of reduced lists in this step and the men's lists of acceptable women have at most one
woman.
Proof. If the algorithm stops at step t, this means that every proﬁle of reduced lists ob-
tained in this step has no cycles, otherwise n would not be the last step. Then there is
at most one acceptable woman in each man's lists since there is a cycle for P (µ) if and
only if P (µ)(m) has more than one acceptable woman for some m. On the other hand,
the M-optimal matching under each one of these proﬁles must be the W-optimal matching
under the original preferences, which shows that all these proﬁles must be the same.
Hence, we have proved that this algorithm stops after a ﬁnite number of steps.
Example. In section 1.2 we have proved that the set of stables matchings has a lattice
structure. Now, we have enough tools to show how we can ﬁnd every matching. We shall
follow the algorithm described along this section. In 1.5 we have the preference list of the
agents of the market.
P (m1) w1 w2 w3 w4 P (w1) m4 m3 m2 m1
P (m2) w2 w1 w4 w3 P (w2) m3 m4 m1 m2
P (m3) w3 w4 w1 w2 P (w3) m2 m1 m4 m3
P (m4) w4 w3 w2 w1 P (w4) m1 m2 m3 m4
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.5: Preference list on a marriage market
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First of all we have to ﬁnd the M-optimal and W-optimal stable matchings to compute the
reduced proﬁle list of each agent. We use the deferred acceptance procedure, although it can
be seen without using the algorithm.
µM = ((m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w3), (m4, w4))
µW = ((m1, w4), (m2, w3), (m3, w2), (m4, w1))
We can observe that the list of preferences cannot be reduced because the ﬁrst entrance of
each man is µM (m) and the worst is µW (m). Similarly for women.
Now, we want to ﬁnd a cycle. Consider man m1. His second choice is w2 who is the ﬁrst
choice for m2 and m2's second choice is w1 who is the ﬁrst choice for m1. This means that
σ1 = (m1,m2) form a cycle. So we have another stable matching:
µ1 = ((m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w3), (m4, w4))
Analogously σ2 = (m3,m4) is a cycle.
µ2 = ((m1, w1), (m2, w2), (m3, w4), (m4, w3))
With these two new stable matchings, by using the lattice structure, we can generate:
µ3 = µ1 ∧M µ2 = ((m1, w2), (m2, w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w3))
Figure 1.6: First sub-lattice structure
Now, taking as reference matching µ3, we built the reduced lists P (µ3) by deleting in each
preference list P (µi) the ﬁrst woman (and as consequence the last man in woman preference
list P (wi).
We see that the resulting proﬁle, proﬁle 1.7, has two more cycles: σ4 = (m1,m4) and
σ5 = (m2,m3). So we have two more stable matchings:
µ4 = ((m1, w3), (m2, w1), (m3, w4), (m4, w2))
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P (m1) w2 w3 w4 P (w1) m4 m3 m2
P (m2) w1 w4 w3 P (w2) m3 m4 m1
P (m3) w4 w1 w2 P (w3) m2 m1 m4
P (m4) w3 w2 w1 P (w4) m1 m2 m3
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.7: Proﬁle of reduced list P (µ3)
µ5 = ((m1, w2), (m2, w4), (m3, w1), (m4, w3))
With these two new stable matchings we can generate:
µ6 = µ4 ∧M µ5 = ((m1, w3), (m2, w4), (m3, w1), (m4, w2))
Figure 1.8: Second sub-lattice structure
We now consider the reduced proﬁle P (µ6).
P (m1) w3 w4 P (w1) m4 m3
P (m2) w4 w3 P (w2) m3 m4
P (m3) w1 w2 P (w3) m2 m1
P (m4) w2 w1 P (w4) m1 m2
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.9: Proﬁle of reduced list P (µ6)
Repeating the procedure with this reduced list, the reduced list shown in 1.9, we ﬁnd two
more cycles, σ5 = (m1,m2) and σ6 = (m3,m4) that generates, respectively, the following
stable matchings:
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µ7 = ((m1, w4), (m2, w3), (m3, w1), (m4, w2))
µ8 = (m1, w3), (m2, w4), (m3, w2), (m4, w1))
With these two matchings we can generate another matching:
µ9 = µ7 ∧M µ8 = ((m1, w4), (m2, w3), (m3, w2), (m4, w1)) = µW
Figure 1.10: Third sub-lattice structure
As we expected the last stable matching generated doing this procedure is the W-optimal
stable matching, so we can ensure that we have found all possibles stable matchings for the
marriage market given.
1.5.2 The number of stable matchings
At this point, we have seen how to ﬁnd all stable matchings given a particular market.
But this is not always feasible due to the fact that the number of stable matchings may
grow exponentially with the size of the market. Due to the relation between the size of
the market, suppose n, and the number of stable matchings, we will denote the number of
stable matchings by f(n).
In this section we are going to consider a given instance of size n, (M,W,P ) and we will
give a lower bound for f(n). As we remark in previous sections, a lower bound, given any
instance of size n is 1. This is, at least one stable matching exists, the one given by the
deferred acceptance algorithm.
In this section we are going to add the assumption that the preference list of every agent
in the market contains all agents of the opposite sex, that is, remaining single is the worst
possibility. As in previous sections, we assume preferences are strict.
A trivial upper bound given an instance of size n is n! but to ﬁnd a better bound is an
open problem.
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The following lemma establishes the exponential growth rate of the function f(n).
Lemma 1.5.1. Given stable marriage instances of sizes m and n with x and y stable
matchings respectively, there is an instance of size mn with at least max(xym, yxn) stable
matchings.
Proof. Suppose that men and women in the given instances are labelled as:
a1, · · · , am, c1, · · · , cm and b1, · · · , bn, d1, · · · , dn
where ai, bj ∈ M ∀i = 1, · · · ,m and ∀j = 1, · · ·n and ci, dj ∈ W ∀i = 1, · · · ,m and
∀j = 1, · · ·n. Consider the instance of size mn in which:
• The men are labelled (ai, bj), i = 1, · · · ,m, j = 1, · · · , n.
• The women are labelled (ci, dj), i = 1, · · · ,m, j = 1, · · · , n.
• Man (ai, bj) prefers (ck, dl) to (ck′ , dl′) if bj prefers dl to dl′ , or if l = l′ then ai prefers
ck to ck′ .
• Woman (ci, dj) prefers (ak, bl) to (ak′ , bl′) if dj prefers bl to bl′ , or if l = l′ then ci
prefers ak to ak′ .
Let µ1, · · · , µn be any sequence of (not necessarily distinct) stable matchings in the instance
of size m, and let µ be any stable matching in the instance of size n. The total number of
choices available for µ1, · · · , µn and µ is clearly yxn. Then we claim that the mapping
(ai, bj)←→ (µj(ai), µ(bj))
is a stable matching in the composite instance.
It is immediately clear that this mapping is actually a matching, since both µj and µ are
matchings. So suppose that this matching is blocked by the pair ((a, b), (c, d)). Then, of
the following conditions, and taking into account preferences are assumed to be strict, we
must have either (i) or (ii) together with either (iii) or (iv).
i b prefers d to µ(b).
ii d = µ(b) and a prefers c to µj(a).
iii d prefers b to µ(d).
iv b = µ(d) and c prefers a to µj(c).
Of the four possibilities, the combination of (i) with (iii) is precluded by the stability of µ,
(ii) with (iv) by the stability of µj , and the others by simple incompatibility.
Hence our claim is justiﬁed, and we have demonstrated an instance with at least yxn stable
matchings. Likewise, by interchanging the roles of the original two instances, we establish
the corresponding result for xym.
Theorem 1.5.1. For each n ≥ 1, n power of 2, there is a stable marriage instance of size
n with at least 2n−1 stable matchings.
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Proof. We shall prove it by induction:
• Initial case: For n = 20, the trivial instance of size 1, admits a single stable matching.
For n = 21 there exist at least one stable matching, the one obtained applying
deferred acceptance algorithm when men propose.
• Assume it true for n = 2k: We apply repeatedly the construction of Lemma 1.5.1
with m = 2 and the instance of size 2 shown in ﬁgure 1.11 below. For this instance,
both possible matchings are stable, so that x = 2 and, by the inductive hypothesis,
y = 22
k−1. Hence, by Lemma 1.5.1, there exists an instance of size 2 ·2k = 2k+1 with
at least max(2 · (22k−1)2, 22k−1 · 22k) = 22k+1−1 stable matchings, as required.
P (m1) w1 w2 P (w1) m2 m1
P (m2) w2 w1 P (w2) m1 m2
Men's preferences Women's preferences
Figure 1.11: Example of an instance of size 2
It turns out that Theorem 1.5.1 gives a rather low estimate of the number of stable match-
ings. For example, we have already seen that the instance of size 4 shown in ﬁgure 1.3,
has 10 stable matchings rather than 8.
In fact, if n is power of 2, it can be shown (further information in [5]) that if xn represents
the number of stable matchings in the instance of size n so generated, then:
xn = 3x
2
n/2 − 2x4n/4
for n ≥ 4. This recurrence relation leads to the table of values shown in ﬁgure 1.12, where
the values are compared to the bound 2n−1 given by the theorem.
k n = 2k 2n−1 xn
1 2 2 2
2 4 8 10
3 8 128 268
4 16 32768 195472
Figure 1.12: Lower bounds for the maximum number of stable matchings
1.6 A remark on other markets
In this section we want to focus on two particular extensions of the stable marriage problem.
As we have seen, this problem involves two disjoint sets. Our next cases of study are
concerned on markets where we have just one set of participants or when we have three
sets to match. The ﬁrst one is called the room-mate problem and the second one is called
the man-woman-child problem.
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One of the most signiﬁcant results we achieve during this work is that, on the marriage
stable problem, there always exist a stable matching. Now, we are going to show in each
of these two new cases that the preferences of the agents involved may be such that no
stable matching exist.
1.6.1 One-sided markets
The room-mate problem is essentially a version of the marriage problem involving just one
set, that is a one-sided market. Each person in the set, of even cardinality n, ranks the
n − 1 others in a list of preferences. The object is to ﬁnd a stable matching, which is a
partition of the set into n/2 pairs of room-mates such that no two person who are not
room-mates prefer each other to their actual partners.
We shall illustrate that not always a stable matching exists giving a simple example de-
scribed in the paper of Gale and Shapley [4].
Example. Consider an instance of size 4 with the preferences given in 1.13.
P (a) b c d
P (b) c a d
P (c) a b d
P (d) arbitrary
Figure 1.13: Preference lists on a one-sided market
We can observe that person d is the last choice of everyone else. Each of the other people
is someone else's ﬁrst choice. So no matching will be stable, since any matching must pair
someone with agent d, and that someone will be able to ﬁnd another person to make a
blocking pair. Possible matchings are:
µ1 = ((c, b), (a, d)) µ2 = ((a, b), (c, d)) µ3 = ((d, b), (a, c)).
In each of these matchings we have a blocking pair which are (c, a) in µ1, (c, b) in µ2 and
(a, b) in µ3.
We can ﬁnally conclude using this example that we cannot always ﬁnd a stable matching
on one-sided markets.
In spite of this result, Knuth 6, found an eﬃcient algorithm (polynomial-time in the worst
case) to generate a solution, if one exist.
6Donald Ervin Knuth (January 10, 1938) is an American computer scientist, mathematician, and Pro-
fessor Emeritus at Stanford University. He is the author of the multi-volume work The Art of Computer
Programming. Knuth has been called the "father" of the analysis of algorithms. He contributed to the de-
velopment of the rigorous analysis of the computational complexity of algorithms and systematized formal
mathematical techniques for it.
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1.6.2 Three-sided markets
The child-woman-man problem is essentially an extension of the marriage problem, in
which there are three sets of people: men, women and children. In this market, a matching
is a division of the people into groups of three, containing one man, one woman and one
child. Each person has preferences over the set of pairs he or she might possibly be matched
with.
A man, a woman and a child (m,w, c) block a matching if m prefers (w, c) to µ(m); w
prefers (m, c) to µ(w) and c prefers (m,w) to µ(c). As in one-sided markets, we shall
demonstrate the non existence of a stable matching giving a particular example.
Example. Consider three men, three women and three children with the preference list
detailed in 1.14.
P (m1) (w1, c3) (w2, c3) (w1, c1) · · · arbitrary
P (m2) (w2, c3) (w2, c2) (w3, c3) · · · arbitrary
P (m3) (w3, c3) · · · arbitrary
P (w1) (m1, c1) · · · arbitrary
P (w2) (m2, c3) (m1, c3) (m2, c2) · · · arbitrary
P (w3) (m2, c3) (m3, c3) · · · arbitrary
P (c1) (m1, w1) · · · arbitrary
P (c2) (m2, w2) · · · arbitrary
P (c3) (m1, w3) (m2, w3) (m1, w2) (m3, w3) arbitrary
Figure 1.14: Preference list on a three-sided market
We can aﬃrm that no stable matching exists.
1. All matchings that givem1 (respectivelym2 and w2) a better family than (m1, w1, c1)
(respectively (m2, w2, c2)) are unstable. To see this fact, we can note that any match-
ing containing either (m1, w1, c3) or (m2, w2, c3) is blocked by (m3, w3, c3) and any
matching containing (m1, w2, c3) is blocked by (m2, w3, c3).
2. Any matching that does not contain (m1, w1, c1) (respectively (m2, w2, c2)) is either
blocked by (m1, w1, c1)(respectively (m2, w2, c2))) or is unstable as already shown in
item 1 above.
3. Finally, (m1, w2, c3) blocks any matching that contains (m1, w1, c1) and (m2, w2, c2).
So all matchings are unstable.
Chapter 2
The college admission model
In this chapter we are going to focus on those markets where matchings are many to one.
Since there are a large variety of examples of these markets: students and colleges, workers
and ﬁrms, medical interns and hospitals, we are going two refer one side of agents as
colleges and the other one as students.
The main idea of this problem is that each student would like to attend a college and has
preferences over colleges and the option of remaining unmatched. Each college would like
to recruit a maximum number of students determined by its capacity. Colleges have also
individual preferences over students and the option to let a sit unﬁlled but, in addition,
they have preferences over groups of students under responsive preferences.
2.1 The formal model
We will assume that the rules of the market are:
1. Any student may enrol to a college if they both agree.
2. Any college may choose to keep one or more of its positions unﬁlled.
3. Any student may remain unmatched if he or she wishes.
Let C and S be two ﬁnite and disjoints sets, C = {c1, · · · , cn} called the set of colleges
and S = {s1, · · · , sm} called the set of students. Each student s ∈ S has preferences over
the colleges and each college c ∈ C has preferences over the students.
As in the marriage model, we will assume that these preferences are complete and transitive
1, so they may be represented by an ordered list as follows:
P (c) = {s1, s2, c, s3, · · · }
1A relation β is complete if for all x, y ∈ X, xβy or yβx, and it is transitive if for all x, y, x,∈ X, xβy
and yβz implies that xβz
29
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This particular list denotes that s1 and s2 are acceptable students but, college c prefers
to leave a position unﬁlled before enrolling somebody else, that is, all other students are
unacceptable. Similarly we can form a preference list for each student in the market.
We will denote ci >s cj to indicate that student s prefers college ci to cj , and ci ≥s cj to
indicate that s prefers ci at least as well as cj . Similarly we can compare preferences of
colleges lists.
College c is acceptable to student s if c ≥s s, and student s is acceptable to college c if
s ≥c c.
As in the marriage problem, we will abbreviate preferences lists just including the accept-
able alternatives.
Deﬁnition 2.1.1. We call quota of college c a positive integer qc ∈ N which indicates the
number of positions oﬀered by the college, namely the maximum number of positions it may
ﬁll. If we denote a particular college by ci, its quota will be denoted by qi.
An outcome of the college admissions model is a bilateral matching between students and
colleges such that each student is matched to at most one college and each college is
matched to at most its quota of students. As in the marriage model, if some student has
not been assigned to any college he or she will be self-matched, and a college that has some
number of unﬁlled positions will be matched to itself in each of those positions.
Now, we are going to give a formal deﬁnition of an outcome.
Deﬁnition 2.1.2. A matching µ is a map from the set C ∪ S into the set of unordered
families 2 of elements of C ∪ S such that:
• |µ(s)| = 1 for every student and µ(s) = s if µ(s) /∈ C.
• |µ(c)| = qc for every college c and if the number of students in µ(c), say r, is less
than qc, then µ(c) contains qc − r copies of c.
• µ(s) = c if and only if s ∈ µ(c).
Example. We will represent a matching as:
µ =
(
c1 c2 (s4)
s1 s3 c1 s2 s4
)
This matching represents that college c1, which has a quota q1 = 3, is matched with two
students s1 and s3 and leaves an unﬁlled position. College c2 has a quota q2 = 1 and has
been matched with s2. Finally the student s4 is unmatched.
At this point we clearly have a diﬀerence between the marriage model and the college
admissions model. In the ﬁrst one, we can compare matchings, that is, we could know
which match would prefer each agent between diﬀerent alternatives only comparing his or
her own assignments in the diﬀerent outcomes. In the college admission model, students
will also compare matchings in the same way.
But, even thought we have described colleges' preferences over students, each college with
a quota greater than one must be able to compare groups of student in order to compare
2For any set X, an unordered family of elements of X is a collection of elements, not necessarily distinct,
in which the order is irrelevant.
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alternative matchings. Hence we have to introduce a new concept that allows us to compare
between groups of students.
Deﬁnition 2.1.3. Let P#(c) denote the preference relation of college c over all assign-
ments µ(c) it could receive at some matching µ of the college admissions problem. A college
c's preferences P#(c) will be called responsive to its preferences P (c) over individual stu-
dents if, for any two assignments that diﬀer in only one student, it prefers the assignment
containing the most preferred student.
We can state the deﬁnition formally as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.1.4. The preference relation P#(c) over the set of students is responsive if,
whenever µ′(c) = µ(c) ∪ {sk} \ {σ} for σ ∈ µ(c) and sk /∈ µ(c), then c prefers µ′(c) over
µ(c) (under P#(c)) if and only if c prefers sk to σ (under P (c)).
It is clear by the deﬁnition that not all type of groups can be compared. For example if
we suppose a college with a quota of two, responsiveness does not specify if this college
prefers its ﬁrst and fourth options instead of its second and third choices.
The assumption that colleges have responsive preferences is essentially no more than the
assumption that their preferences for sets of students are related to their ranking of indi-
vidual students in a natural way.
We will henceforth assume that colleges have preferences over groups of students that
are responsive to their preferences over individual students as well as being complete and
transitive, and that each agent's preferences over alternative matchings correspond exactly
to his or her preferences over his or her own assignments at the two matchings.
2.2 Stability and group stability
As in the marriage model, our goal is to ﬁnd how we can create stable matchings. For this
reason we ﬁrst need to deﬁne what is a stable matching and discuss what is group stability.
Deﬁnition 2.2.1. A matching µ is individually irrational if µ(s) = c for some student s
and a college c such that either the student is unacceptable to the college or the college is
unacceptable to the student. Such a matching will also be said to be blocked by the unhappy
agent.
Deﬁnition 2.2.2. A matching µ is blocked by the college-student pair (c, s) if µ(s) 6= c
and c >s µ(s) and s >c σ for some σ ∈ µ(c).
From this last deﬁnition we note that σ may equal either some student s′ or an unﬁlled
position.
Now, we can deﬁne what a stable matching is in the sense discussed for the marriage model.
Deﬁnition 2.2.3. A matching µ is stable if its not blocked by any individual agent or any
college-student pair.
In contrast to stable matchings in the marriage model, the deﬁnition of stability in the
college admissions model is not so clear because a matching is one to many so we might
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consider coalitions consisting of a college and several students, or even coalitions consisting
of multiple colleges and students. In what follows we shall prove that when preferences are
responsive, nothing is lost by concentrating on simple college-student pairs.
Deﬁnition 2.2.4. A matching µ is group unstable, or it is blocked by a coalition A, if
there exists another matching µ′ and a coalition A, which may consist of multiple students
and/or colleges, such that for all students s ∈ A and for all colleges c ∈ A:
• µ′(s) ∈ A, i.e., every student in A who is matched by µ′ is matched to a college in A.
• µ′(s) >s µ(s), i.e., every student in the coalition prefers matching µ′ to the matching
µ.
• If σ ∈ µ′(c) then σ ∈ A ∪ µ(c), which means that every college in A is matched at µ′
to new students only from A, although it can continue being matched with some of
its old students from µ(c).
• µ′(c) >c µ(c).
From this deﬁnition we can conclude that a matching µ is blocked by some coalition A if, by
a matching among themselves, the students and colleges in A could all get an assignment
preferable to µ.
Deﬁnition 2.2.5. An outcome is a group stable matching if it is not blocked by any coali-
tion.
Now, we shall prove that, when preferences are responsive, this deﬁnition of group stability
is equivalent to the deﬁnition we give for college-students pairs (deﬁnition 2.2.3).
Theorem 2.2.1. Under responsive preferences a matching is group stable if and only if it
is stable (by pairs).
Proof. We shall prove both implications.
⇒ We suppose that µ is unstable via an individual agent (college or student) or via a
college-student pair. Under this assumption µ is clearly unstable via the coalition
consisting of this or these agents.
⇐ We suppose that µ is blocked via a coalition A and an outcome µ′, this means
µ′(s) >s µ(s) ∀s ∈ A. Let c ∈ A then, by the assumption, µ′(c) >c µ(c) so there
exist a student s ∈ µ′(c)− µ(c) and σ ∈ µ(c)− µ′(c) such that s >c σ.
If we suppose that σ ≥c s, ∀σ ∈ µ(c)− µ′(c), then µ(c) ≥ µ′(c), because preferences
are responsive and transitive, which is a contradiction.
Hence, take that student s ∈ µ′(c) − µ(c), there exists σ ∈ µ(c) − µ′(c) and s >c σ.
Note that s ∈ µ′(c)− µ(c) implies s ∈ A and hence c >s µ(s) so µ is unstable via s
and c.
Note that this theorem achieves the same conclusion as the theorem in the marriage model
which says that instabilities that can arise from coalitions of any size can be identiﬁed by
examining only small coalitions.
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2.3 College admissions model versus marriage model
Once analysed the notion of stability in the college admission model, we will investigate if
we can guarantee the existence of stable matchings, as it is the case of the marriage model.
2.3.1 College admissions as an induced marriage market
The last theorem in the previous section, Theorem 2.2.1, allows us to concentrate in small
coalitions instead of large groups of agents, so we identify stable matchings using only
individual preferences, that is the list of preferences P , without knowing the preferences
that a college has over a group of students P#(c).
This suggest that the college admissions model may be very similar indeed to the marriage
model. To describe this similarities we have to transform, a little, the model we described
in section 2.1. Doing that, many results obtained for the marriage model will generalize
immediately to the college admissions model.
Suppose a particular college admission problem such that there are n colleges C = {c1, · · · , cn}
with quotas q1, . . . , qn and m students S = {s1, . . . , sm}. Their preferences are given by
the list P = {P (c1), . . . , P (cn), P (s1), . . . , P (sm)}.
We can suppose that each college ci ∀i = 1, · · ·n with a quota qi ≥ 1 is broken in qi pieces
of itself. Hence for, in our new market there will be students and college positions, each
of them of quota one. That is, we replace ci by qi positions of ci denoted by ci,1, · · · , ci,qi .
Each of these positions have preferences over students that are identical to those of ci.
We are going to assume that a student s for whom college cj is acceptable will strictly
prefer cj,1 over all the other positions of cj .
If preferences are strict, we have built a one-to-one correspondence between matchings in
the original admissions problem and matchings in the marriage model.
If preferences are strict there only exists one marriage market that corresponds to the
college admissions model but, if preferences over individuals are not strict (if colleges are
indiﬀerent between some students), there can be more than one matching in the related
marriage market corresponding to a given matching of the college admissions problem. We
will not consider this last option.
Theorem 2.3.1. A matching of the college admissions problem is stable if and only if the
corresponding matching of the related marriage market is stable.
This theorem and the previous construction we did in this section allows us to conclude
some results without proving them, simply considering them as an extension of the marriage
problem.
Gale and Shapley in [4] observed that the algorithm discussed for the marriage problem,
the deferred acceptance algorithm, could be modiﬁed for the college admission problem.
This fact allows us to extend some theorems we have presented in previous sections that
are directly consequences of the deferred acceptance algorithm. We are going to present
these theorems giving two versions: the ﬁrst one is from the marriage problem and the
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second one is its extension to the college admission problem.
Theorem 2.3.2. Existence theorem.
• Marriage model: For any marriage market (M,W,P ) there always exists at least one
stable matching.
• College admission model: For any college admissions problem (C, S, P ) there always
exists at least one stable matching.
Theorem 2.3.3. Optimality theorem.
• Marriage model: When all men and women have strict preferences there always
exists a M-optimal stable matching and a W-optimal stable matching.
• College admission model: When agents have strict preferences, the set of stable
outcomes contains a C-optimal stable outcome and a S-optimal stable outcome.
Although we have not deﬁned optimality concepts for the college admission problem, due
to the construction we have done, the deﬁnition must be clearly analogous in both markets.
2.3.2 Limitations to the relationship with the marriage market
In section 2.1, when we introduce our model, we see that one of the most important
diﬀerences between both markets is that in many to one markets not all outcomes are
comparable. That is, for a college c ∈ C with preferences P (c) = {s1, s2, s3, s4} the
matching which assigns students s2 and s3 cannot be compared with the matching which
assigns students s1 and s4.
The purpose of this section is to present one theorem which behaves diﬀerently in both
markets, mainly because of the fact we have explained and even though colleges have
responsive preferences. This illustrates that we cannot see the college admission model as
a simple extension of the marriage market.
Theorem (Weak Pareto Optimality) There does not exist any outcome µ that every
man prefers to the M-optimal stable matching µM in the marriage problem. Similarly,
there exists no outcome µ′ preferred by all women to µW .
Proposition 2.3.1. When colleges have responsive preferences, the conclusion about Weak
Pareto Optimality is false for the college admissions problem; there may exist outcomes that
colleges strictly prefer to the C-optimal stable matching.
Proof. The proof will be by means of an example.
Let us consider a market consisting of three colleges C = {c1, c2, c3} and four students
S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. College c1 has a quota q1 = 2 and both other colleges have a quota
of 1. We are going to suppose that every college prefers some student before leaving a
position unmatched. Figure 2.1 shows how their lists of preferences are:
The deferred acceptance algorithm with colleges choosing gives the C-optimal stable out-
come:
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P (c1) s1 s2 s3 s4 P (s1) c3 c1 c2
P (c2) s1 s2 s3 s4 P (s2) c2 c1 c3
P (c3) s3 s1 s2 s4 P (s3) c1 c3 c2
P (s4) c1 c3 c2
Colleges preferences Students preferences
Figure 2.1: Preference list on a college admissions problem.
µC =
(
c1 c2 c3
s3 s4 s2 s1
)
If we consider now the feasible outcome µ such that:
µ =
(
c1 c2 c3
s2 s4 s1 s3
)
we clearly can see that outcome µ gives to c2 and c3 their ﬁrst choice which is preferred by
them over their assignment in µC which match them with their second choice. Outcome µ
is also preferred than outcome µC for c1, because preferences are responsive and µC gives
to c1 its third and fourth choice students and outcome µ gives to c1 its second and fourth
options which are better than the other ones due to the deﬁnition of responsive preferences.
This completes the demonstration that the conclusion of Weak Pareto Optimality is false
in the college admissions problem when colleges have responsive preferences.
2.4 The labour market for medical interns
We are going to present here a well known real-life application of the college admission
model.
The National Resident Match Program (NRMP) 3, began in 1952 in response to dissatis-
faction with the process and results of matching applicants to residency programs via the
decentralized, competitive market. From shortly after the ﬁrst residency programs were
formally introduced, the hiring process was "characterized by intense competition among
hospitals for (an inadequate supply) of interns." In general, hospitals beneﬁted from ﬁlling
their positions as early as possible, and applicants beneﬁted from delaying acceptance of
positions. The combination of these factors lead to oﬀers being made for positions up to
two years in advance. While eﬀorts made to delay the start of the application process
were somewhat eﬀective, they ultimately resulted in very short deadlines for responses by
applicants, and the opportunities for dissatisfaction on the part of both applicants and
hospitals remained. The students in 1951 protested against the originally proposed match-
ing algorithm, and objected to the hospital-optimal nature of the proposed algorithm. The
3In 1968 the National Intern Matching Program (NIMP) was renamed the National Intern and Resident
Matching Program (NIRMP), and in 1978 renamed the National Resident Matching program (NRMP) to
reﬂect the changes suﬀered in the structure of positional graduate medical training.
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NRMP stated that students from 1951 objected to an algorithm that gave them incentives
to misrepresent their true preferences.
A publication in 1962 by Gale and Shapley noted that there always exists a stable solution
when colleges are matched to students, but that it is possible to favour colleges as a group
over applicants as a group (and vice-versa). That is, Gale and Shapley found that there is
a college-optimal stable matching and an applicant-optimal stable matching.
Controversy arose regarding whether the program was susceptible to manipulation or un-
reasonably fair to employers. Indeed, it was shown that in simple cases (i.e. those that
exclude couples, second-year programs, and special cases for handling unﬁlled slots) that
had multiple "stable" matchings, the algorithm would return the solution that was best for
the hospitals and worst for the applicants. It was also susceptible to collusion on the part
of hospitals: if hospitals were to organize their preference lists properly, the result returned
would be completely unaﬀected of the preference lists of the residents. A correspondence
in New England Journal of Medicine in 1981 recognized that the algorithm in use was
hospital-optimal for individual applicants, in direct contradiction to the NRMP's pub-
lished statements.The promotional NRMP literature was revised to remove the detailed,
step-by-step description of their algorithm that had been there before.
Despite many indications for updating the NRMP algorithm, it saw only minor and in-
cremental changes after its institution in 1952 until 1997. However, in the fall of 1995
the Board of Directors of the NRMP commissioned a preliminary research program for
the evaluation of the current algorithm and of changes to be considered in its operation
and description, and a study comparing a new algorithm with the existing one. The new
algorithm was adopted in May 1997 and has been in use since its ﬁrst application in March
1998, although the study showed that the net eﬀect of the change on actual matches has
been minimal.
Our main object in what follows is deeply study the ﬁrst version of the assignment algo-
rithm established by NIMP. As we explained when we introduced this discussion, before
1945 there were a lot of reasons for continually advancing the date at which interns were
appointed. Although hospitals all preferred as late an appointment as possible, each pre-
ferred to appoint its interns earlier than its competitors: the situation is well modelled as
a multiple-agent Prisoner's Dilemma 4.
To analyse the market after 1945 we consider a market formed by a set H = {h1, · · · , hm}
of hospital programs oﬀering positions to ﬁrst-year graduates and a set S = {s1, · · · , sn}
of graduating students. The rules of the game are those one we explained at the college
admission model. Actually, the labour market for medical interns is an example of a college
admissions problem where hospitals act as colleges and medical interns as students.
We are going to present the NIMP algorithm, extracted literally from [9].
Each hospital program rank orders the students who have applied
to it (marking "X" any students who are unacceptable) and each
4A Prisoner's Dilema is a paradox in decision analysis in which two individuals acting in their own
best interest pursue a course of action that does not result in the ideal outcome. The typical prisoner's
dilemma is set up in such a way that both parties choose to protect themselves at the expense of the other
participant. As a result of following a purely logical thought process to help oneself, both participants ﬁnd
themselves in a worse state than if they had cooperated with each other in the decision-making process.
CHAPTER 2. THE COLLEGE ADMISSION MODEL 37
student rank orders the hospital programs to which he has applied
(similarly indicating any which are unacceptable). These lists are
mailed to the central clearinghouse, where they are edited by re-
moving from each hospital program's rank-order list any student
who has marked that program as unacceptable, and by removing
from each student's list any hospital which has indicated he is un-
acceptable. The edited lists are thus rank orderings of acceptable
alternatives.
These lists are entered into what may be though of as a list-
processing algorithm consisting of a matching phase and a tentative-
assignment-and-update phase. The ﬁrst step of the matching phase
(the 1:1 step) checks to see if there are any students and hospital
programs which are top-ranked in one another's ranking. (If a
hospital hi has a quota of qi then the qi highest students in its
ranking are top-ranked.) If no such matches are found, the match-
ing phase proceeds to the 2:1 step, at which the second ranked
hospital program on each student's ranking is compared with the
top-ranked students on that hospital's ranking. At any step when
no matches are found, the algorithm proceeds to the next step, so
the generic k:1 step of the matching phase seeks to ﬁnd student-
hospital pairs such that the student is top-ranked on the hospital's
ranking and the hospital is kth ranked by the student. At any
step where such matches are found, the algorithm proceeds to the
tentative-assignment-and-update-phase.
When the algorithm enters the tentative-assignment-and-update-
phase from the k:1 step of the matching phase, then the k:1matches
are tentatively made; i.e., each student who is a top-ranked choice
of his kth choice hospital is tentatively assigned to that hospital.
The rankings of the students and hospitals are then updated in the
following way.
Any hospital which a student sj ranks lower than his tentative
assignment is deleted from his ranking (so the updated ranking
sj tentatively assigned to his kth choice now lists only his ﬁrst k
choices) and student sj is deleted from the ranking of any hospital
which was deleted from sj 's ranking (so the updated rankings of
each hospital now include only those applicants who haven't yet
been tentatively assigned to a hospital they prefer).
Note that, if one of a hospital's top-ranked candidates is deleted
from its ranking, then a lower-ranked choice moves into top-ranked
category, since the hospital's updated ranking has fewer students,
but the same quota, as its original ranking. When the rankings
have been updated in this way, the algorithm returns to the start
of the matching phase, which examines the updated rankings for
new matches. Any new tentative matches found in the matching
phase replace prior tentative matches involving the same student.
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(Note that new tentative matches can only improve a student's
tentative assignment, since all lower ranked hospitals have been
deleted from his ranking.)
The algorithm terminates when no new tentative matches are found,
at which point tentative matches become ﬁnal. That is, the algo-
rithm matches students with the hospitals to which they are ten-
tatively matched when the algorithm terminates. any student or
hospital position which was not tentatively matched during the
algorithm is left unassigned, and must make subsequent arrange-
ments by directly negotiating with other unmatched students or
hospitals.
Theorem 2.4.1. The NIMP algorithm is a stable matching.
Proof. When the algorithm ends, each hospital hi is matched with the top qi choices on
its ﬁnal updated rank-order list. This assignment is stable, since any student sj who some
hospital hi originally ranked higher than one of its ﬁnal assignees was deleted from hi's
ranking when sj was given a tentative assignment higher in his or her ranking than hi.
Hence, the ﬁnal assignment give sj a position he or she ranked higher than hi. So the ﬁnal
matching is not unstable with respect to any such (hi, sj).
The fact of stability explains why the NIMP algorithm was able to achieve such rates of
voluntary participation.
Theorem 2.4.2. For any submitted lists of (strict) preferences over individuals, the NIMP
algorithm produces a matching that gives each hospital hi its ranked achievable students.
This theorem shows that the algorithm implemented by NIMP is hospital-optimal but if
hospitals act as students and vice versa the algorithm is student-optimal. As we have
shown in chapter one, there does not exist a stable M-optimal and W-optimal matching
simultaneously (unless only one stable matching exists) so, depending of who is proposing
the outcome turns into a sense or into another sense.
In the college admissions model we have the same problem and due to the fact that NIMP
published the algorithm they used a new controversy arise: NIMP decided to do the
algorithm in terms of optimality for hospitals and students completely disagree.
Chapter 3
The school choice model
School choice is one of the widely discussed topics in education. It means giving parents
the opportunity to choose the school their child will attend.
The main purpose of this chapter is to present the complexity of school choice problem
as a two-sided matching assignment problem. We are going to study children assignments
at US cities (mainly Boston and New York), which were the cities where matching theory
was ﬁrst applied to solve the assignment problems.
Traditionally, children were assigned to public schools according to where they live. Wealthy
parents already have the possibility of choosing school, because they can aﬀord to move to
an area with good schools, or they can enrol their child in a private school. Parents with-
out such means, until recently, had no choice of school, and had to send their children to
schools assigned to them by the district, regardless of the school quality or appropriateness
for the children.
In real-life many of school assignment plans had protocols and guidelines for the student
assignment without explicit procedure. In spite of that, in some cities school choice pro-
grams are accompanied with explicit procedures, but parents could do strategic behaviours
to reach their ﬁrst school option. For these reasons a central issue is created in order to
design a fair mechanism to assign students, since the main problem is the impossibility to
assign each student to his top choice school.
Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, [1] and [2], and Gale [4] proposed three diﬀerent ways to
assign students in a fair way.
In the two previous chapters we study marriage market and college admission market, by
exploring the kind of matchings we might expect to observe and its properties. In school
choice problem a concept even more important than stability appears, that is strategic
behaviour, which is the study of how we should expect agents to behave.
The goal of this work is not to issue a verdict about which of these procedures gives a
better chance to reach equality between children, it is only to present the alternatives and
study their properties in such a way they give us tools to decide which of them we want
to apply to make the assignment. Nevertheless this section presents the reasonable doubt
about if it really exists a procedure that gives all children equal opportunities.
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3.1 The formal model
Let be I and S to disjoint sets, I = {i1, . . . , in} will be the set of students and S =
{s1, . . . , sm} the set of schools. As in Chapter 2, we are going to consider a capacity vector
(a quota for each school), as q = (qs1 , . . . , qsm). We also are going to consider a proﬁle
of strict preferences for students P = (pi1 , . . . , pin) and a strict priority structure of the
schools over students f = (fs1 , . . . , fsn). That is, a school choice problem is a 5-tuple
(I, S, q, P, f).
We denote i and s a a generic student and a generic school, respectively. The preference
relation Pi has the same notation that in the previous models, so, Pi ∈ S ∪ {i}, where,
if Pi = {i} then this students is outside the market (for example enrolling on a private
school). If we denote s′ >i s, then student i prefers school s′ over s and ﬁnally, school s is
acceptable to i if s >i i.
The priority ordering fs of school s assigns ranks to the students according to their priority
for school s. The rank of student i for school s is fs(i). Then, fs(i) < fs(j) means that
student i has higher priority (or lower rank) for school s than student j.
This priority structure of the schools over students is the main diﬀerence between the
college admission model and the school choice model. We can observe that in school
choice model schools are mere objects to be consumed by students, whereas in the college
admission model both sides of the market are agents with preferences over the other side.
Deﬁnition 3.1.1. In a particular school choice problem (I, S, q, P, f) an outcome of this
problem is a function µ from the set S ∪ I into itself such that:
• ∀i ∈ I, |µ(i)| = 1 and µ(i) ∈ S ∪ {i}.
• ∀s ∈ S, |µ(s)| ≤ qs and |µ(s)| < qs if and only if all students are assigned. Schools
cannot leave voluntarily a position unﬁlled.
• ∀s ∈ S and i ∈ I, µ(i) = s if and only if i ∈ µ(s).
As we have seen in chapter 1 and 2, stability plays a crucial role in matching problems,
and this is also the case for school choice problems.
Deﬁnition 3.1.2. Let be (I, S, q, P, f) a school choice problem. A matching µ is stable if:
• It is individually rational, i.e., ∀i ∈ I, µ(i) >i i.
• Is is non wasteful, i.e., for all i ∈ I and ∀s ∈ S, s >i µ(i) implies |µ(s)| = qs.
• There is no justiﬁed envy, there is no blocking pair, i.e., for all i, j ∈ I with µ(j) = s,
s >i µ(i) implies fs(j) < fs(i).
In school choice, stability can be understood as a fairness criterion since no children will
attend school that is not acceptable for him and there is no situation in which student
i is matched to a worse school than school s, if s admits another student who has lower
priority at s than i does (or has a vacant seat).
Weak Pareto optimality is deﬁned by the same way as we deﬁned it in chapter one. The only
diﬀerence is that we only study optimality for students, since schools have not preferences
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over students.
3.2 Strategic questions
When we introduce this section, we mentioned the importance to predict how agents can
act if they know how the assignment works. The hypothesis of knowledge about how the
mechanism works is essential in what follows, otherwise this study has no sense.
The study of agents behaviour is known as strategic questions. To address these questions
of individual behaviour, we need to model the decisions that individuals may be called
upon to make in the course of the market. The main question when we analyse strategic
behaviour can be formulated as:
It is always in each agent's best interest to state his or her true preferences to the
matchmaker?
The answer of this question is No, there will be situations in which some agent could obtain
a preferred partner (or school or college) if he behaves strategically.
We need to introduce some notation in order to develop this new theory. If Q represents
the choices of all agents, and we want to focus on the decision facing one of them, say
agent i, then we will write Q = (Qi, Q(i)), where Q(i) is the choice of player i and Qi is
the set of choices of all agents other than i. If we consider Q′ = (Qi, Q′(i)), then Q′ and
Q diﬀer only in player i's choice.
Deﬁnition 3.2.1. A matching mechanism is a function h whose range is the set of all
possible inputs, and whose output is a matching h(Q).
Deﬁnition 3.2.2. A particular strategy choice Q∗(i) by a player i is a best response by
i to Qi if player i likes the outcome h(Qi, Q
∗(i)) at least as well as any of the outcomes
h(Qi, Q(i)) that is, h(Qi, Q
∗(i)) ≥i h(Qi, Q(i)).
Deﬁnition 3.2.3. A dominant strategy for an agent i is a strategy Q∗(i) that is the best
response to any Qi of the remaining agents.
If h(Q) is always stable with respect to Q, it will be called a stable matching mechanism.
Similarly if h(Q) is always Pareto optimal with respect to set of children (or agents in
general if we are studying another model), then it will be called a Pareto optimal stable
matching mechanism.
Deﬁnition 3.2.4. A matching mechanism will be called strategy proof if it makes it a
dominant strategy for each player to state his true preferences in the strategic game it
induces.
The aim in what follows is to know if optimality, stability and strategy-proofness can be
given simultaneously in an arbitrary matching mechanism.
Theorem 3.2.1. Impossibility Theorem No stable matching mechanism exists for which
stating the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every agent.
Proof. It will be suﬃcient to demonstrate that a matching problem exists for which no
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stable matching procedure has truthful revelation as a dominant strategy. Consider a
market with two agents in both sides of the market {i1, i2} and {j1, j2}, i.e. a one-to-one
market, with preferences P given by P (i1) = {j1, j2}, P (i2) = {j2, j1}, P (j1) = {i2, i1}
and P (j2) = {i1, i2}.
Then there are two stable matchings µ and ν given by: µ(ik) = jk for k = 1, 2 and
µ(ik) = jl for k, l = 1, 2 and k 6= l. So any stable mechanism must choose either µ or ν
when preferences P are stated.
Suppose the mechanism choose µ. We can observe, for example, that if j2 changes his stated
preferences from P (j2) toQ(j2) = i1 while everyone else states their true preferences, then ν
is the only stable matching with respect to the preferences P ′ = (P (i1), P (i2), P (j1), Q(j2)),
and any stable mechanism must select ν when the stated preferences are P ′.
So it is not a dominant strategy for all agents to state their true preferences, note that j2
improves by misrepresenting his preferences. That is all stable matching mechanism are
not strategy proof.
Theorem 3.2.2. The mechanism that yields a children optimal stable matching (in terms
of stated preferences) makes it a dominant strategy for each child to state his true prefer-
ences.
Proof. For a detailed proof see [8]
3.3 Matching mechanisms
In this section we are going to present diﬀerent assignment algorithms to form matchings
given a school choice problem. The main diﬀerence between them is the way the students
are rejected.
In general 1, for each school a priority ordering is determined according to the following
hierarchy:
• First priority: sibling and walk zone.
• Second priority: sibling.
• Third priority: walk zone.
• Fourth priority: other students.
For each algorithm we are going to give a practical example. When the algorithm would be
described we are going to study properties of the resulting matching. These last examples
will show the importance of the design of the algorithms in school choice, since each
algorithm we are going to present gives a diﬀerent matching with completely diﬀerent
properties.
1Catalonia assigned accumulative points to students according to the following hierarchy: sibling (40
points), home walk zone (30 points), parents work walk zone (20 points), school and home in the same
town (10 points), disabilities (10 points) and complementary points for poor economic situations maximum
of 15 points depending on the situation.
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And at this point, matching theory cannot decide which mechanism is better. It is then
time for authorities to choose which property is more desirable: stability or strategy-proof?
3.3.1 Boston mechanism
Boston mechanism is known as an immediate acceptance algorithm. Let us explain the
main ideas of this algorithm, based on [1].
Step 1: Each student submits a preference ranking of the schools.
Step 2: In Step 1 only the ﬁrst choices of the students are considered. For each school,
consider the students who have listed it as their ﬁrst choice and assign seats of the school
to these students one at a time following their priority order until either there are no seats
left or there is no student left who has listed it as his ﬁrst choice.
Step k: Consider the remaining students. All students who are assigned in a previous
step cannot be removed. In Step k only the kth choices of these students are considered.
For each school still with available seats, consider the students who have listed it as their
kth choice and assign the remaining seats to these students one at a time following their
priority order until either there are no seats left or there is no student left who has listed
it as his kth choice.
The procedure terminates after any step k when every student is assigned a seat at a
school, or if the only students who remain unassigned listed no more than k options.
Example. We are going to apply the Boston mechanism to a small market in order to
show that it can produce unstable matchings. Let be I = {i1, i2, i3} the set of children and
let be S = {s1, s2} the set of schools. Consider the preferences proﬁle detailed in 3.1, where
each school has a quota of one:
P (i1) s2 s1 P (s1) i1 i2 i3
P (i2) s1 P (s2) i3 i1
P (i3) s1 s2
Children preferences School preferences
Figure 3.1: Preference list on a marriage market
The resulting matching applying Boston mechanism is:
µ = ((i1, s2), (i2, s1), (i3, ∅))
Clearly the resulting matching is not stable since pair (i3, s2) is a blocking pair and it is
not strategy-proof since children i3 could gain presenting an alternative preference relation
P ′(i3) = s2.
The Boston mechanism attempts to assign as many students as possible to their ﬁrst choice
school, and only after all such assignments have been made does it consider assignments of
students to their second choices, etc. The main problem in this assignment mechanism is
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that: if a student is not admitted to his ﬁrst choice school, his second choice may already
be ﬁlled with students who listed it as their ﬁrst choice. That is, a student may fail to
get a place in his second choice school that would have been available had he listed that
school as his ﬁrst choice. This has the potential both to change the preference rankings
that some families submit, and to work to the disadvantage of families that fail to take
into account of such strategic considerations.
Proposition 3.3.1. The Boston mechanism is not strategy-proof and can produce unstable
matchings.
Deﬁnition 3.3.1. A school is over-demanded if the number of students who rank that
school in his ﬁrst choice is greater than the quota of this school.
Proposition 3.3.2. No one who lists an over-demanded school as a second choice will be
assigned to it by the Boston mechanism, and listing an over-demanded school as a second
choice can only reduce the probability of receiving schools ranked lower.
Boston mechanism was working since 2003 but ﬁnally it was replaced by a strategy-proof
mechanism indeed to help families by allowing them to state their true preferences.
3.3.2 Top trading cycles mechanism
As already mentioned, it is costly under the Boston mechanism to list a ﬁrst choice that
you will do not succeed in getting because, once other students are assigned their ﬁrst
choice places, they cannot be displaced even by a student with higher priority. This is
avoided under the student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. For a given list of
preferences, student priorities and school capacities, this mechanism determines a student
assignment following the same steps we described in previous sections for the marriage
model or college admission model.
In contrast with the Boston algorithm, the deferred acceptance algorithm assigns seats only
tentatively at each step, so students with higher priorities may be considered in subsequent
steps. For these reason we have proved in previous sections that the resulting matching is
stable. Moreover all students prefer their outcome to any other stable matching and the
induced mechanism is strategy proof. If the intention of the school board is that priorities
be strictly enforced this mechanism will be leading candidate.
However, if welfare considerations apply only to students, there is tension between stability
and Pareto optimality. If priorities are merely a device for allocating scarce spaces, it might
be possible to assign students to schools they prefer by allowing them to trade their priority
at one school with a student who has priority at a school they prefer. The mechanism we
want to analyse, the top trading cycles mechanism creates a virtual exchange for priorities.
For a given list of priorities, student preferences and school capacities this mechanism
determines a student assignment with the algorithm we are going to present.
Deﬁnition 3.3.2. In the school choice model, a cycle is an ordered list of schools and
students {i1, s1, i2, s2, . . . , ik, sk} with student 1 pointing to school 1, school 1 to student 2,
. . ., student k to school k, and school k pointing to student 1.
Step 1: Assign counters for each school to track how many seats remain available. Each
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student points to his favourite school and each school points to the student with the highest
priority. There must be at least one cycle. Each student is part of at most one cycle. Then
each student in the cycle is assigned to the school she/he points to. The counter of each
school is reduced by one and if it reaches zero, school is removed.
Step k: Each remaining student points to his favourite school among the remaining
schools and each remaining school points to the student with the highest priority among
the remaining students. There is at least one cycle. Every student in a cycle is assigned
a seat at the school he points to and is removed. The counter of each school in a cycle is
reduced by one and if it reaches zero, the school is removed.
The procedure terminates when each student is assigned a seat or all submitted choices
have been considered. This algorithm due to [1] is an extension of Gale's top trading cycles
described in [13].
Example. Let be I = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7} and S = {s1, s2, s3} with the preference proﬁle
detailed in ﬁgure 3.2 and 3.3. We are going to apply the algorithm detailed to form a
matching.
P (i1) s1 s2 s3
P (i2) s1 s2 s3
P (i3) s2 s3 s1
P (i4) s3 s2 s1
P (i5) s2 s3 s1
P (i6) s3 s1 s2
P (i7) s2 s1 s3
Figure 3.2: Children's preference list
P (s1) q1 = 2 i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7
P (s2) q2 = 2 i2 i4 i6 i1 i3 i5 i7
P (s3) q3 = 3 i1 i3 i5 i7 i2 i4 i6
Figure 3.3: School's preference list
1. In this ﬁrst step all students points to his favourite school and each school to his
favourite student. If there are any cycles, we remove the student and we substract
one to the count of the school. If the count is zero, we remove this school.
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i1
i2
i3
i4
i5
i6
i7
s1
s2
s3
Figure 3.4: First step TTC
We can see (3.4) that we have one cycle, thus formed by pair (i1, s1), so we substract
one in s1's counter and we remove student i1.
2. In the second step all remaining students point to his most preferred school and each
school points to his most preferred student remaining on the market.
i2
i3
i4
i5
i6
i7
s1
s2
s3
Figure 3.5: Second step TTC
The only cycle formed on this step (see 3.5) is that where (i2, s1) are matched. We
have to substract one in the counter of s1 and then this school has no more seats, so
we remove it.
3. In the third step we have a cycle formed by (i3, s2, i4, s3, i3) (see 3.6), that is we match
i3 to s2 and i4 to s3.
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i3
i4
i5
i6
i7
s2
s3
Figure 3.6: Third step TTC
4. In this fourth step we have the graph described in 3.7. At this moment the counter
of s2 is one and two for s3.
i5
i6
i7
s2
s3
Figure 3.7: Fourth and last step TTC
After this step, the counter for school two is zero since (i5, s2) is a cycle. For this
reason children i6 and i7 are automatically assigned to school s3 where two positions
are available.
The resulting matching is:
µ = ((i1, s1), (i2, s1), (i3, s2), (i4, s3), (i5, s2), (i6, s3), (i7, s3))
Theorem 3.3.1. The Top trading cycles mechanism is Pareto-eﬀcient and strategy-proof.
Proof. For a detailed proof see [1].
One of the most relevant properties when we analysed a matching is stability. We are
going to see in the following example that the resulting matching of the top trading cycles
algorithm may not be stable.
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Example. We are going to apply the top trading cycles algorithm to the same market we
have applied the Boston mechanism in section 3.3.1. We are going to show that for this
same market top trading cycles algorithm gives a completely diﬀerent resulting matching.
Let be I = {i1, i2, i3} and S = {s1, s2} with the preference list detailed in Figure 3.3.
The resulting matching applying the top trading cycles mechanism is:
µ = ((i1, s2), (i2, ∅), (i3, s1))
We can observe that his resulting matching is not stable since the pair (i2, s1) is a blocking
pair but it is Pareto eﬃcient and strategy proof.
In appendix B we present a code in C that can produce the matching resulting of applying
the top trading cycles procedure introducing three new assumptions, in order to simplify
the problem.
Finally and concluding this chapter on school choice, we remark that three mechanisms
are proposed. The Boston mechanisms is not stable and not strategy-proof, the Deferred
Acceptance mechanism is stable and strategy-proof but does not guarantee eﬃciency. Com-
pared to that, the Top Trading Cycles algorithm is eﬃcient and strategy-proof but does not
guarantee stability. The last two are strategy-proof, so they both avoid strategic behaviour
on the side of parents.
Conclusions
Even if considering that the main objectives of this study have been achieved, as it allowed
me to deepen in a rigorous way on the matching theory, I would have liked to study in
a more detailed way the school choice model, and consequently be able to assess more
accurately some issues that might seem incomplete in this report. A deeper assessment on
the school choice model was not possible since it was ﬁrst necessary to completely develop
the one-to-one matching theory and the college admission model. Hence, a deeper analysis
of the third model would have considerably enlarged the scope and amount of work of the
present study.
One of the main and initial purposes of this ﬁnal degree project was to complete it by
studying the assignment model for all the Catalan primary schools. I have not been able
to provide any results on this subject due to the lack of cooperation from the responsible
authorities on this area (Catalan government and local authorities) who denied to provide
any information related to school assignment due to the conﬁdentiality level of this data.
The impossibility of having the information from the authorities brought me to keep in-
quiring on this subject until very recently. Even not having the data about the Catalan
school assignment model, many questions can be raised only by reading the rules that
manage this matching mechanism. The main question is why parents can only apply for
ﬁve schools, taking into account that, if their child is not selected in any of their choices,
he enters into a completely random phase where he can be assigned to any school of the
municipality (even very far away from his residence). The mentioned restriction seems
illogical once the three assignment methods have been assessed.
The latest available references, mainly coming from the USA, rely into considering an
assignment model in more quantiﬁable terms (stability, strategy, eﬃciency). In my opinion,
even if this trend shall be strongly considered, it still has to be questioned the point-based
system that determines the priority level of each child in each school. This system classiﬁes
children in terms of the points they get for each school. The points a child gets depend
on his particular familiar, ﬁnancial and social situation and will determine the school he is
assigned to, trying to provide all the children with equal opportunities. In this study, no
debate on the limitations that the model shows has been done as it was not its purpose,
even though, it is clear that social conﬂicts might emerge as consequence of the limitations
that the theoretical model shows. Regarding the situation exposed, I strongly expect that
dedicated studies can analyse the Catalan situation of school assignments in a near future.
Finally, and despite all the diﬃculties that I had to face, the present study has given to
me the opportunity to see a practical application on real life matters of diﬀerent subjects
I have learned during my years of studies.
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Appendix A
Deferred acceptance C code
In chapter one we have analysed the deferred acceptance algorithm and how it can give an
M-optimal stable matching if men are proposing or an W-optimal stable matching if are
women who are proposing.
In this appendix we write a code, in language programming C, that will return to the user
the M-optimal stable matching if the market given is square, that is, if there are as many
men as women and all agents in one side of the market are acceptable for the agents on
the other side of the market.
/∗Deferred acceptance a l gor i thm ∗/
#include<s td i o . h>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
int main (void ){
int n , ∗∗m, ∗∗w, ∗a , ∗msin ,∗mpref , i , j , k , cont , m1, m2;
/∗Dinamic memory f o r matrix ∗/
p r i n t f ( "Deferred  acceptance  algor ithm ,  men propos ing \n" ) ;
p r i n t f ( " S i z e  o f  the  market ,  n = " ) ;
s can f ( "%d" , &n ) ;
m = ( int ∗∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ∗ ) ) ;
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
m[ i ] = ( int ∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f (m[ i ]==NULL){
puts ( "mal loc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
}
w = ( int ∗∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ∗ ) ) ;
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
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w[ i ] = ( int ∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f (w[ i ]==NULL){
puts ( "mal loc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
}
a = ( int ∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( a==NULL){
puts ( "mal loc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
msin = ( int ∗) mal loc (n∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f (msin==NULL){
puts ( "mal loc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
mpref = ( int ∗) c a l l o c (n , s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( mpref==NULL){
puts ( " c a l l o c  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t ( 1 ) ;
}
/∗Reading data ∗/
p r i n t f ( "Men l i s t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s : \ n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
for ( j =0; j<n ; j++){
scan f ( "%d" , &m[ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
}
p r i n t f ( "Women l i s t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s : \ n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
for ( j =0; j<n ; j++){
scan f ( "%d" , &w[ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
}
/∗ I n i t i a l i z e v e c t o r s ∗/
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
a [ i ] = −1;
msin [ i ] = −1;
}
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/∗DA algor i thm ∗/
cont = n ;
while ( cont !=0){
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
i f (msin [ i ]==−1){
k = m[ i ] [ mpref [ i ] ] ;
/∗Match man i wi th woman k∗/
i f ( a [ k ] == −1){
a [ k ] = i ;
msin [ i ] = 0 ;
} else {
m1 = −1;
m2 = −1;
for ( j =0; j<n ; j++){
i f (w[ k ] [ j ]==a [ k ] )
m1 = j ;
i f (w[ k ] [ j ]== i )
m2 = j ;
i f (m1!=−1 && m2!=−1)
break ;
}
i f (m2<m1){
msin [ a [ k ]]=−1;
mpref [ a [ k ] ]++;
a [ k ] = i ;
msin [ i ] = 0 ;
} else {
mpref [ i ]++;
}
}
}
}
cont = 0 ;
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
i f (msin [ i ]==−1) cont++;
}
}
/∗ So lu t i on ∗/
for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
p r i n t f ( " (m%d ,w%d)\n" , a [ i ] , i ) ;
}
f r e e ( a ) ;
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for ( i =0; i<n ; i++){
f r e e (w[ i ] ) ;
f r e e (m[ i ] ) ;
}
f r e e (w) ;
f r e e (m) ;
f r e e (mpref ) ;
return 0 ;
}
Appendix B
Top Trading Cycles C code
In chapter three we have analysed the Top Trading Cycles algorithm to assign children to
schools. Due to its importance in front of Boston mechanism, in this appendix we present
a code, in language programming C, that will return the matching resulting of applying
the algorithm described.
In order to simplify the problem we add some assumptions:
• No child can remain unmatched.
• Agents in both side of the market have a complete list of preferences.
• There are at least as many seats as children.
/∗Top Trading Cyc les a l gor i thm ∗/
#include<s td i o . h>
#include<s t d l i b . h>
int s o l u t i o n ( int ∗ , int ∗∗ , int ∗ , int ∗ , int , int , int , int ) ;
int cy c l e ( int ∗ , int , int ) ;
void f i l l s o l ( int ∗∗ , int , int ) ;
int main (void ) {
int i , j , k , cont , ag , s eat s , ns , nc , ∗∗ sh , ∗∗ch , ∗ch1 ,
∗∗ so l , ∗qs , ∗v , cy , ch i ld , s choo l ;
/∗Dinamic memory f o r matrix ∗/
p r i n t f ( "Top t rad ing  c y l c e s  a lgor i thm with more s e a t s  than
 students \n" ) ;
p r i n t f ( "Number o f  ch i l d r en : \ n" ) ;
s can f ( "%d" , &nc ) ;
p r i n t f ( "Number o f  s choo l s : \ n" ) ;
s can f ( "%d" , &ns ) ;
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ch = ( int ∗∗) mal loc ( nc∗ s izeof ( int ∗) ) ;
for ( i =0; i<nc ; i++){
ch [ i ] = ( int ∗) mal loc ( ns∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( ch [ i ] == NULL) {
puts ( "Mallor  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
}
sh = ( int ∗∗) mal loc ( ns∗ s izeof ( int ∗) ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
sh [ i ] = ( int ∗) mal loc ( ( nc ) ∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( sh [ i ] == NULL) {
puts ( "Mallor  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
}
v = ( int ∗) mal loc ( ( ns+nc+1)∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( v == NULL) {
puts ( "Ca l loc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
ch1 = ( int ∗) mal loc ( ( nc ) ∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( ch1 == NULL) {
puts ( "Malloc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
s o l = ( int ∗∗) mal loc ( ( ns ) ∗ s izeof ( int ∗) ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
s o l [ i ] = ( int ∗) mal loc ( nc∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( s o l [ i ] == NULL) {
puts ( "Malloc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
for ( j = 0 ; j < nc ; j++)
s o l [ i ] [ j ] = −1;
}
qs = ( int ∗) mal loc ( ns∗ s izeof ( int ) ) ;
i f ( qs == NULL) {
puts ( "Malloc  e r r o r " ) ;
e x i t (1 ) ;
}
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/∗Reading data ∗/
p r i n t f ( "Chi ldren  l i s t  o f  p r e f e r e n c e s  over  a l l  p o s s i b l e  
s choo l s : \ n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<nc ; i++){
ch1 [ i ] = i ;
for ( j =0; j<ns ; j++){
scan f ( "%d" , &ch [ i ] [ j ] ) ;
puts ( "Error " ) ;
}
}
p r i n t f ( " Schoo l s  quota : \ n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
scan f ( "%d" , &qs [ i ] ) ;
s e a t s += qs [ i ] ;
}
i f ( seat s<nc ) {
puts ( "ERROR:  At l e a s t  many cha i r s  as  s tudents  are
 r equ i r ed " ) ;
e x i t (2 ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( " Schoo l s  p r i o r i t y  over  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s tudents : \ n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
for ( j =0; j<nc ; j++){
scan f ( "%d" , &sh [ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
}
p r i n t f ( "\ nChi ldren \n−−−−−−−−−−_\n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<nc ; i++){
p r i n t f ( "Child%d :  " , i ) ;
for ( j =0; j<ns ; j++){
p r i n t f ( " %d " , ch [ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( "\n" ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( "\ nSchools \n−−−−−−−−−−\n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
p r i n t f ( " School%d : " , i ) ;
p r i n t f ( " q%d = %d | |  " , i , qs [ i ] ) ;
for ( j =0; j<nc ; j++){
p r i n t f ( " %d " , sh [ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
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p r i n t f ( "\n" ) ;
}
/∗Top t rad ing c y c l e s a l gor i thm ∗/
cont = nc ;
j = 0 ;
while ( cont !=0){
for ( i =0; i <(ns+nc+1) ; i++)
v [ i ] = −1;
/∗ F i l l t he v ec t o r where we are going to f i nd a
c y c l e ∗/
while ( ch1 [ j ]==−1)
j++;
v [ 0 ] = ch1 [ j ] ;
ag = ch1 [ j ] ;
i = 0 ;
cy = −1;
while ( cy == −1) {
i++;
i f ( i%2 == 0) {
k = 0 ;
do{
ch i l d = sh [ ag ] [ k ] ;
k++;
}while ( ch1 [ c h i l d ]==−1) ;
/∗Cycle r e tu rns −1 i f no c y c l e
has been found and the
p o s i t i o n o f the c h i l d i f a
c y c l e has been found ∗/
cy = cyc l e (v , ch i ld , i ) ;
v [ i ] = ch i l d ;
ag = ch i l d ;
}
i f ( i%2 == 1) {
k = 0 ;
do {
schoo l = ch [ ag ] [ k ] ;
k++;
}while ( qs [ s choo l ] == 0) ;
v [ i ] = schoo l ;
ag = schoo l ;
}
}
/∗ So lu t i oon re tu rns how many s e a t s have been
occuped ∗/
cont −= so l u t i o n (v , so l , ch1 , qs , ns , nc , cy , i ) ;
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}
/∗Pr in t ing s o l u t i o n s ∗/
p r i n t f ( "\n\nSOLUTION OF TOP TRADING CYCLE MECHANISM\n" ) ;
p r i n t f ( "
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−\n" ) ;
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
p r i n t f ( "SCHOOL%d = " , i ) ;
for ( j =0; j<nc ; j++){
i f ( s o l [ i ] [ j ] != −1)
p r i n t f ( " %d " , s o l [ i ] [ j ] ) ;
}
p r i n t f ( "\n" ) ;
}
/∗Free memory∗/
for ( i =0; i<ns ; i++){
f r e e ( sh [ i ] ) ;
f r e e ( s o l [ i ] ) ;
}
for ( i =0; i<nc ; i++)
f r e e ( ch [ i ] ) ;
f r e e ( v ) ;
f r e e ( qs ) ;
f r e e ( ch1 ) ;
return 0 ;
}
int cy c l e ( int∗ v , int ch i ld , int n) {
int i =0, cont=−1;
while ( v [ i ] != ch i l d && i<n) {
i +=2;
}
i f ( i<n) {
cont = i ;
}
return cont ;
}
int s o l u t i o n ( int ∗v , int ∗∗ so l , int ∗ch1 , int ∗qs , int ns , int
nc , int beg , int end ) {
int i , cont=0;
for ( i=beg ; i<end ; i+=2){
ch1 [ v [ i ] ]=−1;
cont++;
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f i l l s o l ( so l , v [ i ] , v [ i +1]) ;
qs [ v [ i +1]]−= 1 ;
}
return cont ;
}
void f i l l s o l ( int ∗∗ so l , int ch i ld , int s choo l ) {
int i = 0 ;
while ( s o l [ s choo l ] [ i ]!=−1)
i++;
s o l [ s choo l ] [ i ] = ch i l d ;
return ;
}
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